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The compatibility of national exit tax regimes, both by Member States of the European Union (EU) 
and states that are signatories to tax treaties, has been discussed for some time. In the international 
sphere is such a tax widely accepted, but within the borders of the Internal Market1 is it still argued 
whether exit taxes infringe the internal market principles or not. It is commonly accepted since the 
National Grid Indus case2 that exit taxes as such do not infringe the freedom of establishment, but the 
timing of when the tax is to be paid and on what conditions are still uncertain. However, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Court of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA Court) have ruled in 
several cases recently concerning exit taxes, including the regimes of the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Norway, Spain, Denmark and Germany.3 Therefore I will investigate whether the circumstances 
around charge of exit taxes have become more definite. However, I will only cover exit taxes charged 
on companies, hereunder exit tax levied on assets and liabilities that are transferred out of a states tax 
jurisdiction. 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to analyse and discuss to what extent exit taxes that are levied on 
companies are legal within the EU and the European Economic Area (EEA). I will assess the legal 
standpoint of the EU and under the EEA-Agreement, and consider their relation to other tax treaties. 
Further I will scrutinise the domestic exit tax regimes for charge of such taxes on companies of two 
Member States4 and compare them to examine how the Member States may levy such taxes, without 
violating EU-law and/or the EEA-Agreement. The states that will be assed are the EU Member States 
United Kingdom and the EEA Member State Norway. The reason upon the decision of choosing these 
states is that both United Kingdom and Norway the last few years have been found to have corporate 
exit tax regimes that have infringed respectively EU-law and the EEA-agreement. I believe it is 
interesting to see how they have modified their exit tax rules. The aim of the thesis is to clarify the 
legal situation of corporate exit taxes within the EU and the EEA–area. 
 
Increasing global mobility of taxpayers and individual assets has put taxation of taxpayers’ migration 
from one tax jurisdiction to another on the agenda. In principle have the states fiscal sovereignty and 
1 The Internal Market, also known as the Single Market, is made up by the domestic markets of the 28 
EU Member States and three of the EFTA Member States. The market seeks to guarantee the free 
movement of goods, capital, services and people, i.e. the four freedoms.  
2 ”National Grid Indus” case C-371/10. 
3 See NL: ”National Grid Indus” case C-371/10, ”Commission v the Netherlands” case C-301/11, 
”Commission v Portugal” case C-38/10, NO: ”Arcade Drilling AS v Staten v/Skatt vest” case E-
15/11, ”Commission v Spain” case C-64/11, “Commission v Denmark” case C-261/11 and DE: 
”DMC Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH” case C-164/12. 
4 The term Member States will here be used about member states of the Internal Market; the 28 EU 
Member States and the three participating EFTA Member States: Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein.  
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each state is able to determine the scope of their fiscal jurisdiction. Still, in order to avoid double 
taxation, prevent tax evasion and encouraging cross-border trade efficiency have many states entered 
into bilateral as well as multilateral agreements to allocate taxing powers. The two most important 
treaties regarding the principles of exit taxation is laid down in the OECD Model Convention5 6 
(OECD MC) and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union7 (TFEU), which both effects 
the Member States ability to charge exit taxes on migrating taxpayers. Although neither of the treaties 
contains any provisions specifically addressing the tax consequences of emigrating persons (legal or 
individual).8 Tax aspects are certainly important in a situation where a taxpayer considers migrating to 
another state. In domestic situations are capital gains generally taxed by the home state of the owner 
when the value of the asset is realised, i.e. when the asset is sold or otherwise transferred from one 
party to anther. In a cross-border situation on the other hand, may the home state (the emigration state) 
also impose a tax on unrealised capital gains over the migrating persons assets, which is a so-called 
exit tax.   
 
Exit taxes, as an be understood from the term “exit”, generally refer to all types of taxes that are 
charged when a taxable person moves or an asset or liability is transferred out of the home state, or out 
of reach of the national tax jurisdiction of that state.9 The triggering factor for imposing the tax is the 
change of tax residence or transfer of asset or liability cross-border, i.e. the taxpayer’s, asset’s or 
liability’s exit of it’s tax the jurisdiction of origin. There is two legal theories that concern a 
company’s ability to move and/or change tax residency: the incorporation theory and the real seat 
theory. The incorporation theory connects a company to the jurisdiction in which it has been 
incorporated, and its existence, internal affairs and dissolution of the company are determined by the 
state where the company is incorporated.10 Once a company is correctly incorporated, is it recognised 
everywhere and the company can transfer its seat of management to another state without losing its 
legal personality. As long as the company is incorporated in the state, the emigrating company remains 
subject to the law of that state.11 The real seat theory on the other hand, determines which state has the 
power to regulate the company’s internal affairs by focusing on the substantial connection between a 
5 The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development Model Tax Convention on Income 
and Capital (2010).  
6 The OCED MC provides general principles and definitions accepted by the OECD states, and seeks 
to allocate taxation power in case of a tie in order to avoid double taxation.  
7 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as amended by the 
Treaty of Lisbon (2007). 
8 The same goes for the UN Model Tax Treaty.  
9 See Professor Frederik Zimmer, article ”Exit Taxes in Norway” Word Tax Journal, October 2009 p. 
115. 
10 Christiana Hji Panayi, “Exit Taxation as an Obstacle to Corporate Emigration from the Spectre of 




                                                        
company and the legal system of which it depends upon for formation and the establishment of legal 
personality, i.e. where the company has its actual centre of administration.12 A company has to 
incorporate in the state where it has its real seat of management, in order to be recognised as a 
company in that state.  
 
A company’s tax residence is determined by one of these two theories, or on a combination of the two. 
Whether a company transfers its tax residence or not, relies upon how the state of emigration and the 
state of immigration determines who is a tax resident, i.e. the connecting factor, and accordingly could 
both transfer of real seat or registered office constitute a transfer of tax residency. None of the theories 
are preferred over the other, and it is up to the states to decide the connecting factors in order to 
determine who is a tax resident of the state. As the theories are conflicting is there obviously a risk of 
double taxation, and in order to solve conflicts have many states become signatories to tax treaties.13 
The EU has though refrained from taking a stand regarding which theory is more preferable.  
 
The EU has taken measures to facilitate cross-border reorganisations, and it has created EU corporate 
vehicles (including the EEA); the Societa Europaea (SE) and the Societas Cooperative Europea (SCE). 
The SE and the SCE are the only legal entitles that are allowed to transfer their seat from one Member 
State to another without being subject to the company law restriction that usually apply to the transfer 
of seat of a company.14 The tax issues in relation to cross-border migration remains the same though, 
and either a SE or a SCE company can become subject to exit taxation.  
 
A company’s assets and liabilities can be charged an exit tax if they are transferred out of their state of 
origin, i.e. home state. For instance, if an asset or liability is transferred from a resident company in 
state A, to a permanent establishment (PE) in state B, it is likely that state A will charge an exit tax. 
An exit tax may also be imposed if the transfer goes the other way around, or an asset is transferred 
from a PE in state A to a PE in state B. The reason for this is that a PE, which is established in another 
tax jurisdiction than the parent company, is liable to tax in the state where it is established.15 
 
Exit tax is in essence a tax over unrealised capital gains, and the respectively tax assessment is 
normally done right before the taxpayer migrates to another tax jurisdiction (the immigration state), 
that is at the time when the taxpayer is still a resident of the emigration state, or just before the assets 
12 Ibid. 
13 The OECD MD art 4 (3) puts up a tiebreaker rule in case of conflict, and in the case where a 
company is resident of two contracting states, shall the company´s tax residency be decided upon the 
real seat theory.  
14 Christiana Hji Panayi “European Union Corporate Tax Law” Cambridge tax law series, Cambridge 
University Press, 2013 p. 326. 
15 Art. 7. OECD MC.  
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are transferred to the immigration state.16 Unrealised capital gains are typically the value increase of a 
company’s hidden reserve. Hidden reserves are funds that are not declared on a company’s balance 
sheet e.g. assets and liabilities of the company, in addition to the right to deduct losses on assets and 
liabilities. Such gains and losses on liabilities will mainly refer to foreign-currency gains and losses. 
The term assets include tangible, intangible and financial assets. The logic behind exit taxes is 
typically either a principle of fiscal territory whereby the state taxes unrealised capital gains that 
accrued within to neutralise tax avoidance schemes. Exit taxes may be labelled as the tax of last 
chance, as the states cannot enforce their taxing rights once the taxpayer has left its territory.17  
 
Exit taxes are typically classified in two groups, “immediate exit taxes” and “trailing taxes”. 
Immediate exit taxes are taxes that are imposed shortly before the emigration or transfer of assets, 
while trailing taxes are extended tax liabilities designed to tax future income and realised capital gains 
after the taxpayer transferred its residence to the immigration state.18 Usually will the extended tax 
liability expire after a limited period of time (normally 5 to 10 years) following the emigration, if the 
capital gains is not realised.19 What is important in regard of trailing taxes is that the tax liability is 
established when the taxpayer is still a resident of the emigration state. This form of taxation however 
is not common in the international sphere.20 
 
Exit taxes are characterised by the fact that they are materialised by the act of migration to another tax 
jurisdiction. Member States that charge exit taxes on migrating taxpayers or transferred assets or 
liabilities clearly violate the Internal Market principles, as the migrating taxpayer or transferred assets 
or liabilities become subject to a tax that is not levied on taxpayers or transferred assets or liabilities 
remaining within the Member States borders. Intra-group transfers of assets or liabilities for example, 
are normally not subject to tax when happening within the same tax jurisdiction.  
 
Yet, charge of exit tax is to some extent accepted, which I will discuss in this thesis. Initially will I 
give a short presentation of the EU, EFTA and the EEA-Agreement, and then present the coherent 
conflict between exit taxes and the internal market principles. Following, I will analyse and discuss the 
approach to corporate exit taxes within the EU and the EEA. Further on I will discuss and compare the 
16 Fernando de Man & Tiiu Albon, ”Contradicting Views of Exit Taxation under OECD MC and 
TFEU: Are Exit Taxes Still Allowed in Europe?”, INTERTAX, Volume 39, Issue 12, 2011 Kluwer 
Law International BV, The Netherlands, p. 613-626 at p. 613-614. 
17 Klaus von Brocke & Stefan Müller, ”Exit Taxes: The Commission versus Denmark Case Analysed 
against the Background of the Fundamental Conflict in the EU: Territorial Taxes and an Internal 
Market without Barriers” published in ec Tax review 2013-6 p. 299-304, p. 299.   
18 Above mentioned Fernando de Man & Tiiu Albon.  
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. 
 7 
                                                        
different exit tax practices in United Kingdom, France and Norway. In the end will I give some 
concluding remarks on the subject. 
 
2 The EU, the EFTA and the EEA-Agreement  
 
Before I continue I will give a short presentation of the EU, the EFTA and EEA-Agreement.  
 
2.1 The EU  
 
The EU is a regional organisation of 28 Member States21 primarily situated in Europe. The 
organisation can trace its roots back to 195022, and have since then developed to become a Union of 
which the majority of the European countries are members, in addition to have expanded its 
competence areas significantly. The institutional framework now consists of seven institutions: the 
European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice, the 
European Central Bank and the Court of Auditors. The Unions ultimate objective is full European 
integration23 however; its precise scope is as yet not determined in detail.24 All nationals of the 
Member States are now also citizens of the Union, and this grants them certain rights.25 The aims and 
objectives of the Union are many, but overall is it an organisation wanting to encourage European 
integration by promoting peace, freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers to its citizens, 
and establish an internal market to encourage economic growth and price stability.26 The Member 
States have ceded some of their sovereign rights to the EU institutions and have conferred on the 
Union powers to act independently.27 This distinguishes the EU from other international organisations. 
21 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, see 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (10 April 2014) 
22 The French Foreign Minister at the time, Robert Schuman, put forward in his declaration of 9 May 
1950 that he and Jean Monnet wanted to bring Europe’s coal and steel industries together to form a 
European Coal and Steel Community, see Professor Klaus-Dieter Borchardt ”The ABC of European 
Union law” European Union, 2010, p. 11.  
23 Cf. Treaty of the European Union (TEU) art. 1.  
24 See Dr P S R F Mathijsen, “A Guide to European Union Law” tenth edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2010, p 4. 
25 The EU has legal personality cf. TEU art. 47. The rights granted to its citizens are regulated in the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) art. 20-25, and provides, among other rights, 
the right of citizens to move and reside in the territory of all the Member States cf. art. 20 (2) a) and 
art. 21 (1), the right to vote and stand as candidate in elections of the European Parliament and in 
municipal elections on the Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that 
State cf. art. 20 (2) b) and art. 22 (1), in addition to the right to diplomatic and consular protection 
from any other Member State in third countries where their own state is not represented cf. art. 20 (2) 
c) and art. 23.  
26 See the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) art. 1, 2 and 3. 
27 See Professor Klaus-Dieter Borchardt ”The ABC of European Union law” p. 11.  
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The EU has power to adopt legislation that is directly binding upon the Member States and its citizens, 
and it has created an own legal system, i.e. the EU legal system is “supranational”28. It follows from 
the term and the spirits of the Treaties29 that the EU legal system is superior to the national legal 
systems of the Member States.30 In other words, the Member States cannot adopt legislation contrary 
to Union law, and the implementation of Union law cannot vary from one state to another.  
 
2.2 The EFTA 
 
EFTA is an intergovernmental organisation set up to promote free trade and economic integration to 
the benefit its Member States.31 EFTA is governed by the EFTA Council and serviced by the EFTA 
Secretariat, in addition to the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the EFTA Court. The organisation 
was established in 196032 with the purpose to govern free trade relations among its Member States, 
and establish an economic counterbalance to the then- European Economic Community (EEC), which 
is now the EU.33 EFTAs relations to the EU have been of its core activities from the beginning, and 
what started as an agreement to link the EFTA Member States to the internal market, have now 
expanded to also cover additional areas.3435 Not all EFTA Member States are participants to the EEA-
Agreement; Switzerland has chosen to not be a part of the EEA, but has instead negotiated several 
bilateral agreements, including a free trade agreement, with the EU.36 Thus will I neither assess the 
legal stand on exit taxes within Switzerland nor in the relationship between Switzerland and the EU.  
 
2.3 The EEA-Agreement  
 
The EEA -Agreement, which entered into force in 1994, is a treaty that brings together the EU 
Member States and the EFTA Member States Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, in a single market, 
here referred to as the Internal Market. The agreement does not cover all EU policies in the Internal 
28 See Dr P S R F Mathijsen, “A Guide to European Union Law” p 8.  
29 TEU and the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
30 ”Costa v ENEL” case 6-64. 
31 Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland see http://www.efta.int/about-efta/european-free-trade-
association (10 April 2014)  
32 EFTA was established by the Stockholm Convention in 1960. The Convention has later been 
amended, and the latest revision entered into force on June 2002, the Vaduz Convention.   
33 See http://www.efta.int/about-efta/european-free-trade-association (10 April 2014) 
34  Among others, competition polices cf. the EEA Agreement art. 53-60, state aid cf. art. 61-64, social 
policy cf. art. 66-71, consumer protection cf. art. 72, environment cf. art. 73-75 and statistics cf. art. 
76. 
35 Among others, research and technological development, information services, the environment, 
education, training and youth, social policy, consumer protection, small and medium-sized enterprises, 
tourism, the audio-visual sector and civil protection cf. the EEA Agreement art. 78. 
36 See http://www.europa.admin.ch/themen/00500/index.html?lang=en (10 April 2014)  
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Market.37 The EEA Joint Committee is responsible for the management of the agreement.38 All new 
EU Member States do also become members of the EEA.39 The functioning of the Internal Market is 
based on a common set of rules that is binding for all Member States of EU and EEA, consequently is 
the concept of homogeneity important. This is to be achieved firstly by the timely incorporation of EU 
legislation40 into the EEA-Agreement, meaning that as soon as an EEA-relevant EU legal act has been 
formally adopted in the EU side, the EEA Joint Committee shall take a decision concerning the 
appropriate amendment of the EEA- Agreement “with a view to permitting a simultaneous 
application” of legislation in the EU and the EEA/EFTA States.41 Whenever a relevant legal act is 
adopted or amended, a corresponding amendment should be made to the relevant annex of the EEA- 
Agreement42, and then, as the EEA/EFTA States have not transferred any legislative powers to the 
EEA Joint Committee, must the legal act be implemented in the EEA/EFTA State in accordance with 
its constitutional requirements.43 This is a rather significant treaty, as the EEA/EFTA States have 
committed themselves to adopt not only current but also future legislation, which is in fact created 
through a legislative process where the EEA/EFTA States´ ability to contribute is very limited. Eivind 
Smith, a Norwegian professor in public law, have said that the agreement is a “constitutional 
catastrophe”44 as the EEA/EFTA states in practices have transferred sovereign powers to the EU. 
 
The participants of the EEA-Agreement are subject to many of the same legal acts, but there are also 
several differences as the scope of the EU is much bigger than the EEA-Agreement, thus is it relevant 
to compare the two regarding charge of corporate exit taxes.  
 
3. The conflict between exit taxes and the Internal Market principles 
 
Taxes are an essential mechanism for governments to raise revenues, and exit taxes have become an 
important part of many states international taxation regimes. Enhanced international integration as a 
37 The following policies are not covered: Common Agriculture and Fisheries Policies, Customs 
Union, Common Trade Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home Affairs and 
the Monetary Union (EMU).  
38 The EEA Joint Committee is regulated in Section 2 of the EEA Agreement, art. 92-94. 
39 Cf. the EEA Agreement art 128. 
40 EU legislation is adopted by ordinary or special legislative procedure cf. TFEU art. 289. The formal 
legislators of the Union are the European Parliament and the Council, but normally they only act upon 
proposal of the Commission. The EEA/EFTA States are not represented in any of these institutions, 
and they have little or no formal opportunity to influence the Council or the European Parliament. 
However, they have the ability to influence at the preparatory stage when secondary EU legislation is 
amended or a new act is adopted, cf. the EEA Agreement art 102 (1). 
41 Ibid art. 102 (1). 
42 Ibid art. 102 (2). 
43 Ibid art. 103. 
44 Eivind Smith said this in a public hearing regarding approval of the Schengen agreement at the 
Norwegian Storting (Parliament) 5 Mai 1997. 
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result of globalisation has increased corporate cross-border mobility, and consequently has it become 
relatively easy for companies to relocate in order to benefit from more favourable tax systems. This is 
especially true for companies operating within the Internal Market, as the fundamental objectives of 
the Internal Market is to combine the national markets of the Member States in order to create a 
market without borders, where goods and services can be offered and sold on the same conditions and 
where persons and capital can circulate freely.45 Freedom of establishment46 is also among the 
protected rights, and it requires that economic operators, whether person or a company, are able to 
carry on an economic activity in any other EEA State under the same conditions as national economic 
operators.  In other words, the purpose of the Internal Market is that even though the activities 
mentioned are carried out in a cross-border situation, they are to be treated in the same way as 
comparable domestic situations. Cross-border activities are not supposed to be subject to additional 
costs or other obstacles just for the fact that they are not entirely domestic transactions.  
 
Tax rules in general and exit taxes in particular represent barriers for the functioning of the Internal 
Market. The Internal Market is made up by 3147 tax jurisdictions, thus become companies migrating or 
transferring assets or liabilities cross-border subject to the legislation of two or more tax jurisdictions. 
The risk of discrimination and double taxation increase correspondingly and can make migration 
appear less attractive as the companies face additional costs when they have to comply with different 
sets of rules. A tax that makes it less attractive for companies to move and that are only triggered by 
cross-border migration/transfer, may constitute a violation of the freedom of establishment48 and/or 
free movement of capital49.  
 
Nevertheless, exit taxes are regarded as an important tax by many states. An exit tax is, as mentioned, 
basically a tax charged on capital gains of a company’s hidden reserves and can often comprise a big 
amount of money, as a company’s hidden reserves include assets and liabilities, in addition to the right 
to deduct losses on assets and liabilities.  If a state loses its taxing right over income that it is legal 
entitled to, it could create an erosion of the national tax base. From the perspective of a migrating 
company or a company transferring an asset cross-border on the other hand, such a tax could create an 
obstacle. For example: a company wants to migrate to another tax jurisdiction, but in order to do so 
must it pay off an exit tax. The company lacks capital, and in order to pay off the tax is it forced to sell 
machinery or immaterial rights such as trademarks or patents, or get a bank loan. This could make it 
45 See TFEU art 26 and the EEA Agreement art. 1. Freedom of establishment is not mentioned her, 
surprisingly enough. 
46 See TFEU art 49-55 and EEA Agreement art. 31-34. 
47 The 28 EU Member States and the three EFTA Member States. 
48 Art. 49 TFEU. 
49 Art. 63 TFEU. 
 11 
                                                        
less attractive for the company to migrate, and it may choose to maintain its business in the home 
state, even though the migration would have been more beneficial for its economic activities.  
 
The main problem with exit taxes in regard to the principles of the Internal Market is that they are not 
triggered in similar domestic situations. Normally will the value increase of company’s hidden 
reserves not be included in the company’s tax base before the assets or liabilities are disposed of or 
otherwise realised.50 In other words, the income of hidden reserves are not taxed the year they arise, 
but deferred until the capital gain is realised through for example a sale in the open market whereby 
the taxpayer get capital to pay the tax. Hidden reserves do not only arise when an asset increase in 
value, but also when the market value of an asset drops below its book value because of being subject 
to wear and tear or obsolescence, or when intangible assets are created.51 Intangible assets are usually 
not included in a company’s balance sheet,52 but are reported in the income statement. In both 
situations, capital gains relating to a certain tax year are taxed in subsequent periods either by way of 
showing the full value of a specific asset in a subsequent period or by depreciation below its fair 
market value or by simply not showing the asset in the tax balance sheet.53  
 
It is clear that exit taxes may be considered necessary from the states point of view, but such taxes are 
nonetheless problematic in regard of the Internal Market, which seeks to increase trade and economic 
relations between the participating states by encouraging cross-border economic activities to increase 
competition and efficiency. The conflict is evident: on one hand you have the objectives of the Internal 
Market that prohibits discrimination and restrictive treatment of such cross-border transactions, contra 
the states who want to protect their national tax base.  
 
4 To what extent can exit taxes be charged on companies within the EU and the EEA? 
 
 Here will I first analyse and discuss the legal framework for exit taxes charged on companies at EU 
law level, i.e. to what extent such taxes are legal within the EU. Further I will continue to analyse and 
discuss the legal framework for exit taxes applied on companies within the EEA, before I finish up 
50 Klaus von Brocke & Stefan Müller, ”Exit Taxes: The Commission versus Denmark Case Analysed 
against the Background of the Fundamental Conflict in the EU: Territorial Taxes and an Internal 
Market without Barriers” published in ec Tax review 2013-6 p. 299-304, p. 299.   
51 Ibid. 
52 Intangible assets are in general not included in the balance sheet because several intangibles do not 
belong to the company, e.g. employees and relationships. It can be difficult set the market value of 
such assets as their value may be closely linked with related assets and the fact that there is no 
financial transaction creating the intangible asset, as they often are created outside the monetary 
system, see Mary Adams, November 19, 2010: http://www.i-capitaladvisors.com/2010/11/19/why-are-
intangibles-not-on-the-balance-sheet/   
53 Above mentioned Klaus von Brocke & Stefan Müller, p. 299.  
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with comparing the two regimes and discuss the differences. Where it is relevant will I consider the 
position taken by the EU and the EEA in relation to tax treaties, respectively the OECD Model.  
 
4.1 The legality of applying exit taxes on companies within the EU 
 
4.1.1 The EU legal framework for the application of exit taxes on companies  
 
As mentioned, direct taxation have remained a sole function of the Member States, and consequently 
have direct taxation not been referred to in any of the EU Treaties, neither current nor successive,54 
thus are tax consequences of migrating persons not specifically addressed either. Nevertheless, EU- 
law has still managed to heavily influence and control the Member States direct taxation regimes in 
general, and their ability to tax migrating persons in particular. The Member States are obliged to take 
any appropriate measure to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting 
from acts of the institutions of the Union, and refrain from any measure that could jeopardise the 
attainment of the Unions objectives.55 In other words, the Member States have a duty to safeguard the 
objectives set out by the Union and take the necessary actions in order to make them effective. This is 
an important principle in regard of exit taxes, as direct taxation has remained with the Member States. 
 
The ECJ is the EU institution that has had most impact on the Member States exit taxation regimes, as 
I shortly will come back to. However, in the recent years both the Commission and the Council have 
recognised the problematic effects of exit taxes, and taken actions in order to encourage harmonisation 
and cooperation between the Member States in the matter. The Commission was the first, and in 2006 
it announced a series of initiatives seeking to promote better coordination of the Member States 
national direct tax systems. In it’s Communication on exit taxes56 the Commission expressed that the 
Member States would benefit from a coordinated approach in order to ensure that their national law 
was in accordance with EU-law, and to ensure better protection of the exit state’s tax base. The 
Commission was also willing to assist the Member States to draw up guidelines, in order to remove 
discrimination and double taxation, in addition to prevent unintended non-taxation, abuse and tax base 
erosion. The Council Resolution57 on coordination of exit taxes also invites the Member States to 
cooperate in order to avoid double taxation that could result from cross-border transfer of economic 
activities by following the same guiding principles regarding definition of “economic activities” and 
54 See Christiana Hji Panayi ”European Union Corporate Tax Law” p. 3. 
55 Art. 4 (3) TFEU. 
56 COM/2006/0825: “Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee – Exit taxation and the need for co-ordination of 
Member States´ tax policies.”  
57 Council Resolution on coordination exit taxation, 2911th ECONOMIC and FINANCIAL 
AFFAIRS, Brussels, 2 December 2008. 
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valuation of assets, e.g. the host State should allow a step-up in the tax base cost when the home State 
levied an exit tax. Nonetheless, neither communications nor resolutions are legally binding on the 
Member States i.e. soft law, and they only aims at providing guidance. More relevant nevertheless is 
the Commissions right to open infringement proceedings58 against Member States who fail to fulfil 
their obligations confer the Treaties. The Commission have been diligent, and it has during the latest 
years requested several member States to amend their legislation regarding exit taxes, and started 
infringement procedures against Member States that have refused to amend their legislation voluntary.  
 
4.1.1 The legal framework for the application of exit taxes on companies within the EU 
 
Here will I analyse and discuss the ECJ´s case law concerning exit taxes levied on companies. The 
ECJ´s landmark decision regarding exit taxes applied on companies is the National Grid Indus59 case 
from 2011. The judgement was based on two lines of case law: one line concerning migrating 
companies in general, starting with the Daily Mail60 case from 1988, which later was followed by the 
Cartesio case61 in 2008, and the second line about exit taxes imposed on migrating individuals starting 
with the Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant62 from 2004, which later was followed by the N case63 in 
2006. As the above mentioned cases have been important for the ECJ decisions regarding exit taxes 
charged on corporations, is it natural to start with these, before I continue with the ECJ decisions 
concerning exit taxes charged on companies in particular. I will go through the cases in chronological 
order, before I present my conclusion.  
 
4.1.2 The position taken by the ECJ so far 
 
The Daily Mail64 case concerned tax law, but it has been important in the context of migrating 
companies as well. The British company Daily Mail and General Trust PLC decided to transfer its 
central management and control functions to the Netherlands in order to benefit from lower tax rates. 
British company legislation permitted companies to transfer their real seat, whilst remaining status as a 
company of the United Kingdom (UK). The UK tax legislation however, relied on the real seat theory 
and when a company moved its real seat abroad would the company cease to be a UK tax residence. 
As a result of the transfer would Daily Mail exit the British tax jurisdiction, and it was therefore asked 
by the Treasury to sell parts of its assets before transferring its residence. Daily Mail refused to these 
58 Art. 258 and 260 (2) TFEU.  
59 Case C-371/10 “National Grid Indus BV v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond/kantoor 
Rotterdam” (2011) 
60 Case 81/87 “Daily Mail and General Trust” (1988) 
61 Case C-2010/06 “Cartesio” (2008) 
62 Case C-9/02 “Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant” (2004) 
63 Case C-470/04 “N v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdients Oost/kantoor Almelo” (2006) 
64 Case 81/87 “Daily Mail and General Trust” (1988) 
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conditions and initiated proceedings before the court, arguing that the British legislation violated its 
freedom of establishment65 because of the exit requirements.  
 
In its judgement, the ECJ started by stating that freedom of establishment, as set out in the then art. 52 
and 58 of the EEC Treaty, is a fundamental principle of the Community, and that it secures the right of 
establishment in another Member State.66 Even though the provisions are directed mainly at ensuring 
that foreign national and companies are treated in the host Member State in the same way as nationals 
of that State, they also prohibit the Member State of origin from hindering its nationals or a company 
incorporated under its legislation, the establishment in another Member State.67 If the Member State of 
origin could prohibit undertakings from leaving in order to establish themselves in another Member 
State, would the right become worthless. The ECJ found that the as the British provisions only 
required consent from the Treasury when a company was seeking to transfer its real seat out of the 
UK, while maintaining its legal personality and its status as a UK company, it did not impose any 
restrictions on a company’s right to establish in another Member State.68 Moreover, the ECJ pointed 
out “unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the law and, in the present state of 
Community law, creatures of national law.”69 And further that a company exists only by virtue of the 
varying national legislation, which determines their incorporation, and functioning.70 Therefore, it is 
up to the Member State to regulate the connecting factor determining whether a company is 
incorporated in the Member State or not. The freedom of establishment do therefore not give a 
company, that is incorporated under the law of a Member State, the right to transfer its real seat to 
another Member State, while retaining its status as a company incorporated under the legislation of its 
Member State of origin.71 72 The ECJ found correspondingly that the British legislation at issue did not 
violate the freedom of establishment.  
 
In this case, the ECJ recognise that companies are creatures of national law, i.e. companies exists only 
by virtue of national law. Furthermore, a company has no unconditional right to expatriate from its 
Member State of origin, while at the same time retain the status as a company of that state. A Member 
State can yet not hinder a company of another Member State to establish itself within its territory. 
Entry and exit requirements are accordingly treated differently.  
65 Article 52 and 58 of the EEC Treaty, but now article 49 and 54 TFEU. 
66 Case 81/87 “Daily Mail and General Trust” (1988) paragraph 17. 
67 Ibid., paragraph 16. 
68 Ibid., paragraph 18. 
69 Ibid., paragraph 19. 
70 Ibid.  
71 Ibid., paragraph 24. 
72 Freedom of establishment has a very basic wording in the Treaty, and it is set out in the articles 49 
and 54 TFEU that companies must have been formed in accordance with the laws of the Member State 
and have the connecting factor required, in order to benefit from the freedom.  
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In the Cartesio73 case wanted a Hungarian company, Cartesio, to transfer its real seat to Italy, while 
continuing to have Hungarian law as its personal law. This was not possible under Hungarian law, as it 
required that a company incorporated in Hungary had to have its real seat in Hungary, in order to have 
Hungarian law as its personal law. Cartesio claimed accordingly that Hungarian law was contrary to 
the freedom of establishment as set out in articles 43 and 48 EC.74  
 
The ECJ cited the Daily Mail case and repeated that companies are creatures of national law and exist 
only by virtue of the national legislation, which determines its incorporation and functioning.75 
Consequently have the Member States “power to define both the connecting factor required of a 
company if it is to be regarded as incorporated under the law of that Member State,” and to deny 
domestic companies the right to “retain that status if the company intends to reorganise itself in 
another Member State by moving its seat to the territory of the latter, thereby breaking the connecting 
factor require under the national law of the Member State of incorporation.”76 In other words, the 
Member States have the power to determine a company’s existence under national law, and to set 
conditions in order to regulate whether a migrating company maintains to exist under national law. 
However, one must distinguish between whether a company transfers without reincorporation and 
change of governing law, or transfers with reincorporation and change of governing law. EU law 
could govern the second situation, as the company is converted into a form of company that is 
governed by the law of the Member State to which it has moved.77 If the host State allows such 
transfers, then the home State cannot prevent companies, incorporated under its domestic law, from 
migrating by for example require winding-up or liquidation of the company.78 The Hungarian law at 
issue prevented a company, incorporated under domestic law, to transfer its operational seat abroad 
and at the same time continue to be governed by Hungarian law. This was accordingly not a violation 
of the freedom of establishment.  
 
The ECJ upheld its opinion from the Daily Mail79 in the Cartesio80 decision, and it is apparent that the 
ECJ is unwilling to interfere with national rules to regulating what is recognised as a company confer 
domestic law, and subsequently which companies may enjoy the right to freedom of establishment, i.e. 
a company have no right to emigrate while retaining legal registration in its home State, as long as this 
is prohibited under domestic law. However, both cases prove that one must differ between enter- and 
73 Case C-2010/06 “Cartesio” (2008)  
74 Now article 49 and 54 TFEU.  
75 Case C-2010/06 “Cartesio” (2008) paragraph 104. 
76 Ibid., paragraph 110. 
77 Ibid., paragraph 111. 
78 Ibid., paragraph 112.  
79 Case 81/87 “Daily Mail and General Trust” 1988, ECR 5483. 
80 Case C-2010/06 “Cartesio” 2008, ECR I-9641. 
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exit requirements in the situation where a company transfers its central office to another Member 
State, as companies exist through national company law. In other words, as long as a company is 
recognised under the law of one Member State, can another Member State not refuse the company to 
establish itself within the territory of that Member State. After the Cartesio81 case was there a lot of 
theories as to what consequences the case would have for the charge of exit taxes.82  
 
The case de Lasteyrie du Saillant83 is the first case before the ECJ regarding exit taxation. The case 
regarded an individual taxpayer transferring his tax resident from France to Belgium. At the time of 
the transfer the taxpayer, along with his family, held securities conferring entitlement to more than 
25% of the profits of a company subject to corporation tax and established in France. The market 
value of the shares was higher than their acquisition price. The French legislation required the 
unrealised value increase of the shareholdings to be taxed, because of the transfer of tax residence. The 
payment of the tax could be deferred until the capital gain was actually realised, but only if the 
taxpayer provided a guarantee sufficient to ensure recovery of the tax. If the taxpayer still owned the 
shares after five years would the tax be ignored.    
 
The ECJ consider whether the French tax, which was established solely on the ground of transfer of 
tax residence outside of France, is capable of restricting the exercise of freedom of establishment.84 
According to the ECJ, prohibited freedom of establishment the home State from hindering its own 
nationals the establishment in another Member State85, even if the restriction is of limited scope or 
minor importance.86 The French legislation did not prevent French taxpayers from exercising the right 
to freedom of establishment, but it had at least a dissuasive effect as taxpayers’ whishing to transfer 
their tax residence was treated disadvantageous compared to taxpayers who maintained their residence 
in France. The tax was triggered only by the reason of such transfer, and if the taxpayer remained in 
France would taxation of value increases on income be taxed only when, and to the extent that they 
were actually realised. That different treatment was likely to discourage taxpayers from doing such 
transfers.87  
 
Even though it was possible to benefit from suspension of the payment on strict conditions, including 
conditions to provide guarantees, would those guarantees in themselves constitute a restrictive effect 
81 Ibid.  
82 For more about this debate see Christiana Hji Panayi, “Exit Taxation as an Obstacle to Corporate 
Emigration from the Spectre of EU Tax Law”, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, Vol. 
13, 2010-2011, p. 245-281 at part IV.  
83 Case C-9/02 “Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant” (2004) 
84 Ibid., paragraph 39.  
85 Ibid., paragraph 42. 
86 Ibid., paragraph 43.  
87 Ibid., paragraph 45-46. 
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as they deprived the taxpayer from enjoying the assets given as a guarantee.88 The French provision 
was found to be a restriction, and the ECJ then continued to consider whether the restriction could be 
justified: a restriction can be justified if it pursues a legitimate objective compatible with the Treaty 
and is justified by imperative reasons in the public interest. It is further necessary, in such a case, that 
its application is appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective thus pursued, and does not go 
beyond what is necessary to attain it.89 The argument that the exit tax rule was justified on the basis of 
prevention of tax avoidance was rejected. Tax avoidance or evasion could not be inferred generally 
from the fact that the tax residence of a physical person had been transferred to another Member 
State.90 The argument that the provision of guarantees ensured the coherence of the French system was 
also rejected, as the French provisions was aimed at preventing temporary transfers of tax residence 
exclusively for tax reasons. The provisions did not appear however to be aimed at ensuring generally 
that increases in value are to be taxed, in the case where a taxpayer transfers his tax residence outside 
France, in so far as the increases in value question are acquired during the latter’s stay on French 
territory.91 The ECJ also rejected the argument that the restriction was justified because it concerned 
the allocation of tax powers between the home State and the host State.92 The restriction could not be 
justified and was therefore a restriction that breached the freedom of establishment.   
 
The ECJ seemed in this case to be of the opinion that exit taxes in general can be compatible with EU 
law, as long as they are imposed under specific circumstances or are subject to proportionate 
implementing rules. The French legislation went beyond what was necessary as payment of the exit 
tax was not automatically deferred and the taxpayer had to provide security in order to defer the 
payment, i.e. deferral must be automatically available for the taxpayer, without having to provide 
security.  
 
The N93 case concerned the Dutch exit taxation rules. The Dutch provisions required that substantial 
shareholders, i.e. shareholders owning at least 5% of a company’s capital, which transferred their 
place of residence outside the Netherlands became subject to an exit tax. A 10-year deferral of the 
payment of the tax was granted on provision of security. If the shares were not disposed within the 10-
year period were the taxpayer acquitted from their liability and the security released.   
 
Mr N transferred his residence from the Netherlands to the United Kingdom. At the time of the 
migration was he the sole shareholder of three Dutch limited liability companies, the management of 
88 Ibid., paragraph 47. 
89 Ibid., paragraph 49. 
90 Ibid., paragraph 51. 
91 Ibid., paragraph 63-65. 
92 Ibid., paragraph 68.  
93 “N v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdients Oost/kantoor Almelo” (2006) 
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which had since that date been in the Netherlands Antilles. Mr N was charged an exit tax on unrealised 
capital gains. He obtained deferral of the tax as he provided security for the amount. Mr N argued that 
the Dutch provision restricted his freedom of movement. The ECJ however considered whether the 
Dutch rules restricted the freedom of establishment.94 The Court cited the de Lasteyrie du Saillant 
case, and found that a taxpayer wishing to transfer his residence was treated disadvantageous in 
comparison with persons who maintained their residence in the Netherlands, because they had to pay 
tax on unrealised capital gains. Although it was possible to benefit from suspension of payment, that 
was not automatic and subject to conditions, such as provision of guarantees, would those guarantees 
in themselves constitute an restrictive effect, in that they deprived the taxpayer of the enjoyment of the 
assets given as a guarantee. The ECJ also maid a point of the fact that decreases in value occurring 
after the transfer of residence were not taken into account in order to reduce the tax debt, in addition to 
that the tax declaration required at the time of the transferring residence was an additional formality 
likely to hamper persons freedom of establishment. The ECJ concluded that the Dutch rules were a 
restriction the freedom of establishment.95  
 
Next, the ECJ assessed whether the restriction could be justified because of legitimate objectives in 
public interest.96 The Dutch legislation was designed to allocate the power to tax increases of value in 
company holdings between Member States, and to prevent double taxation. The ECJ pointed out that 
in the absence of harmonising EU legislation could the Member States draw inspiration from 
international practice, and in particular the OECD MC, in order to allocate their taxation power to 
eliminate double taxation. The ECJ found that the Dutch provisions were justified by legitimate 
objectives, and the provisions were appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objectives.97 Then, 
the ECJ examined whether the provisions were proportionate.98 Demand of a tax declaration was 
accepted, but the obligation to provide guarantees went beyond what was necessary in order to ensure 
the functioning and effectiveness of such a tax system based on the principle of fiscal territoriality. 
There were methods less restrictive of the fundamental freedoms, e.g. the Mutual Assistance Directive 
for the Recovery of Taxes and the Mutual Assistance Directive for Exchange of Information. The ECJ 
also remarked that in order to be proportionate would the Dutch system have to take full account of 
reductions in value capable of arising after the transfer of residence, unless the host Member State had 
already done so.   
 
94 Ibid., paragraph 21-22: Freedom of movement and residence for citizens cf. art. 45 TFEU, is a 
general right, while freedom of establishment cf. Art. 49 TEU specifically addresses the issue at hand.  
95 Ibid., paragraph 35-39. 
96 Ibid., paragraph 40. 
97 Ibid., paragraph 41-47. 
98 Ibid., paragraph 48. 
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The ECJ upheld the view expressed in the de Lasteyrie du Saillant case, and held that charge of 
immediate exit taxes are likely to restrict the freedom of establishment. The Member States can 
impose an exit tax in the event of transfer of tax residence, but deferral must be automatically 
available. The ECJ also upheld that the obligation to provide guarantee was a restrictive and 
disproportionate measure, yet an obligation to provide a tax declaration at the time of the transfer was 
allowed. In regard of the examination of whether the restriction pursued a legitimate objective in the 
public interest, did the ECJ focus on allocation of taxing rights and found that, as the Dutch provisions 
were designed to allocate taxation between Member States, it pursued a legitimate objective. This was 
not accepted as a legitimate objective in the de Lasteyrie du Saillant case, as the purpose of the French 
legislation at dispute was just to prevent tax evasion. The Dutch legislation in the N case was on the 
other hand especially designed to pursue allocation of taxation powers between Member States, and as 
there was no harmonising EU law had the Member States retained the power to allocate their taxation 
powers, in order to eliminate double taxation. In the Advocate General’s opinion was the different 
treatment of the French and Dutch legislation also supported.99 After finding that the Dutch legislation 
could be justified continued the ECJ to assess whether the legislation was proportionate. The ECJ 
found that most aspects with the Dutch provisions could be considered proportionate, but the 
requirement of guarantees in order to obtain a tax deferral and the fact that the reductions in value after 
the cross-border transfer were not taken into account did not meet the proportionality test. In regard of 
the guarantees did the ECJ note that the Member States had less restrictive measures available, as the 
Mutual Assistance Directive for the Recovery of Taxes and the Mutual Assistance Directive for 
Exchange of Information, and this would be a much less restrictive of the fundamental freedoms.  
 
In the de Lasteyrie du Saillant case and the N case was exit taxes accepted in order to safeguard the 
balanced allocation of taxation powers between Member States, but there are strict limitations 
regarding the proportionality of such rules. Both cases concerned exit taxes levied on natural persons, 
the freedom of establishment however, applies equally to legal persons. The arguments above can 
therefore be made also with respect to exit taxes on companies. This was also supported by the 
Commission in 2006, in its Communication “Exit taxation and the need for co-ordination of Member 
States´ tax policies”, where it expressed that “the interpretation of the freedom of establishment given 
by the ECJ in de Lasteyrie du Saillant in respect of exit tax rules on individuals also had direct 
implications for Member States´ exit tax rules on companies.”100 The Commission also announced 
that it intended to provide guidance on how the Member States should coordinate their tax polices in 
order to ensure the compatibility of such rules with EU law, while at the same time safeguarding the 
99 Advocate-General´s opinion paragraph 100-101. 
100 COM/2006/0825: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee – Exit taxation and the need for co-ordination of 
Member States´ tax policies, p. 5. 
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balanced allocation of taxation powers. The Member States on the other hand, have not yet taken any 
measures in this regard and no actual coordination has taken place since the Communication was 
published.101 In the absence of positive measures to coordinate the Member States exit taxation 
regimes, have negative integration by the ECJ´s case law been important to ensure that EU law is not 
violated. The ECJ however, has refrained from making a distinction between companies and 
individuals in so far as the protective scope of EU law is concerned,102 and there still some uncertainty 
on this matter.   
 
The National Grid Indus103 case is the first case decided by the ECJ regarding exit taxation levied on 
companies. In this case a Dutch company, National Grid Indus BV, wanted to transfer its place of 
effective management to the UK. In order to leave Dutch tax jurisdiction was it charged an exit tax on 
unrealised capital gains on the assets that became subject to transfer. Since 1996 had the company had 
a claim of GBP 33 113 000 against National Grid Company plc., a company established in the UK. 
Following the rise in value of the pound sterling against the Dutch guilder, an unrealised exchange rate 
gain was generated on the claim. National Grid Indus transferred its place of effective management to 
the UK in 2000, and became as a result resident in the UK. Since National Grid Indus after the transfer 
no longer had a PE in the Netherlands was only the UK entitled to tax its profits and capital gains.104 
As the company ceased to derive taxable profits in the Netherlands, did the Dutch tax authorities 
decide that it had to be a final settlement of the unrealised capital gains at the time of the transfer and 
it had to be paid immediately. The company was taxed inter alia on the exchange rate gain on the 
claim mentioned above. National Grid Indus refused to accept the final settlement, and claimed that it 
violated its right to freedom of establishment. The case was brought before the Dutch court, and the 
ECJ was requested to do a preliminary ruling. The referring court asked essentially whether a 
company incorporated under the law of a Member State, which transfers its place of effective 
management to another Member State and is taxed by the former Member State because of the 
transfer, could relay on the freedom of establishment against that Member State. And secondly, if the 
first question was answered affirmative, whether it was contrary to the freedom of establishment that 
the final settlement tax was imposed without deferment and without the possibility of taking 
subsequent decreases in value into consideration, or if it could be justified by the necessity of 
allocating powers of taxation between the Member States.  
 
101 Prof. Dr Otmar Thömmes and Dr Alexander Linn ”Deferment of Exit Taxes after National Grid 
Indus: Is the Requierment to Provide a Bank Guarantee and the Charge of Interest Proportionate?” 
INTERTAX, Volume 40, Issue 8/9 2012 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, p. 485-493 
at p. 487. 
102 Christiana Hji Panayi ”European Union Corporate Tax Law” p. 315. 
103 Case C-371/10 “National Grid Indus BV v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond/kantoor 
Rotterdam” (2011) 
104 Ibid., paragraph 13.  
 21 
                                                        
Initially in regard of the first question, stated the ECJ that a Member State has the power to define, 
inter alia, the connecting factor required of a company to be regarded as incorporated under its 
national law, and that the Member State therefore was free to decide whether a company could retain 
its legal personality under the law of that Member State, and subject it to restrictions on the transfer 
abroad of the company’s place of effective management.105 Yet, in this case would the transfer of 
National Grid Indus place of effective management not affect its status as a company incorporated 
under Dutch law, which applied the incorporation theory,106 and the company could therefore rely on 
article 49 TFEU.107 Conversely, the Court implied here that if a company does not retain its legal 
personality after transfer of office, as would be the case in a state of origin applying the real seat 
theory, would the company not be able to invoke article 49 TFEU under the same conditions. This 
approach creates subsequently a distortion, as situations that appear to be equal will be treated 
differently because Member States have the sole power to determine the connecting factor required to 
be recognised as a company under domestic law.  
 
Then the Court continued to consider whether charge of tax on unrealised capital gains constituted a 
restriction to the freedom of establishment. Here the Court cited the de Lasteyrie du Saillant case and 
N, and found that a company transferring its place of effective management outside the Netherlands, 
was disadvantageously treated in regard of cash flow compared to similar companies retaining its 
place of effective management in the Netherlands.108 In domestic situations was capital gains not taxed 
until the time of realisation, and consequently would the tax charged on unrealised capital gains in a 
cross-border situation constitute a restriction to the freedom of establishment.109  
 
Further considered the ECJ whether the restriction could be justified by overriding reasons in the 
public interest.110 The Netherlands claimed that to safeguard the balanced allocation of taxing powers 
between Member States could justify the restriction. The ECJ affirmed that this was a legitimate 
objective,111 and that the Dutch legislation at issue was appropriate for ensuring this objective.112 
When considering whether the Dutch legislation was necessary or not did the ECJ make a distinction 
between the establishment of the amount of tax and the recovery of the tax. In regard of the definitive 
establishment of the tax found the ECJ that it was proportionate to do this at the time of the transfer 
and added that the Member States was not obliged to take into account value decreases or increases 
105 Ibid., paragraph 27. Here the Court is citing the first the “Centros” case, and then the 
“Überseering” case (case C-208/00). 
106 Ibid., paragraph 28.  
107 Ibid., paragraph 32-33. 
108 Ibid., paragraph 37.  
109 Ibid., paragraph 40-41. 
110 Ibid., paragraph 42. 
111 Ibid., paragraph 45 
112 Ibid., paragraph 48. 
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that occur after the transfer, or possible exchange rate gains or losses.113 This is contrary to its decision 
in the N case where the Court held that a tax system must take full account of decreases in value that 
may arise after the transfer of residence, in order to be proportionate. Immediate recovery of the tax at 
the time of the transfer on the other hand, was not considered proportionate. At this point the Dutch 
legislation went beyond what was necessary, as it did not offer the possibility to defer the payment. 
Accordingly are immediate exit taxes prohibited conferring the freedom of establishment. The ECJ 
held that in order to be proportionate must the Netherlands grant an emigrating company the right to 
opt for deferment of the payment, if the company accepts and is capable of tracing the transferred 
assets and demonstrating that the company continues to own the assets after the migration.114 Then, 
the ECJ stated that as the risk of non-recovery of the tax increases over time, could it be proportionate 
for the Member States to ask for security for example a bank guarantee, in order to defer the payment. 
Furthermore found the ECJ that deferred payment could be rejected in a situation where tracing the 
assets would cause “an excessive administrative burden.”115 If the company finds that deferred 
payment will not cause such a burden, then the Member States cannot decide the contrary. The 
existing machinery for mutual assistance between authorities of the Member States provided the 
national tax authorities sufficiently measures to deal with the administrative burden in regard of 
deferred recovery116 and thus was it up to the company to decide whether it would defer the payment 
or not.  
 
In addition, it was argued that the Dutch legislation at issue could be justified by the need to maintain 
the coherence of the national tax system.117 The ECJ found that this objective could not justify 
immediate recovery of the tax, as only the determination of the tax at the time of the transfer was 
necessary. The risk of tax avoidance was not accepted as a justifying reason either as it could not be 
set up a general presumption of tax evasion by the mere fact of transfer of a company’s place of 
management.118 Finally the ECJ concluded that article 49 TFEU prohibited the Member States to 
charge exit taxes that were due immediately at the time of the transfer. 
 
The National Grid Indus judgment is somewhat both similar and different from the ECJ´s cases on 
exit taxes charged on individuals. As it had done in the de Lasteyrie du Saillant case and the N case, 
accepted the ECJ that exit taxes could be justified in order to safeguard the balanced allocation of 
taxation powers between the Member States, but they can only be levied on certain conditions, e.g. 
immediate exit taxes are likely to restrict the freedom of establishment. Companies should therefore be 
113 Ibid., paragraph 64. 
114 Ibid., paragraph 73. 
115 Ibid., paragraph 77 et seq. 
116 Ibid., paragraph 78. 
117 Ibid., paragraph 79 et seq.  
118 Ibid., paragraph 84. 
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able to choose between immediate- and deferred payment of the tax, as long as it will not be an 
excessive burden for the company. If the payment is deferred is the recovery supposed to happen at the 
time when the capital gain is realised, the Court however says nothing about more about the actual 
time the capital gain is to be considered realised.  
 
If the company decide to defer the payment must it also carry the administrative burden in connection 
with tracing the transferred assets, and possibly pay interest in accordance with national law.119 The 
ECJ´s mentioning of pay of interest charges was surprising, as it was not considered in the de 
Lasteyrie du Saillant case and the N case, or in the Advocate-Generals opinion to the National Grid 
Indus case. The ECJ was very brief on this point, and it is not clear whether the ECJ meant that a 
Member State can charge interest from the moment of the exit or only from the time the capital gains 
are realised.120 The fact that the ECJ also opened for that Member States could ask for a guarantee was 
also rather surprising, as it in the de Lasteyrie du Saillant case and the N case ruled that it was 
disproportionate to ask for a bank guarantee, but it could be possible to ask for a tax declaration. The 
condition for being able to ask for charge of interest or a guarantee is that it also is possible in 
domestic situations. As exit taxes do not exist under national law, is it unclear what may be a 
comparable situation. Nevertheless, it could be difficult to understand the ECJs position that charge of 
interest and requirement of a bank guarantee can be allowed. Immediate taxation was found to be 
disproportionate because it put the company in a disadvantageous situation in regard of cash flow. Yet, 
if the Member States can require a bank guarantee at the time of the transfer and then later charge 
interest will the disadvantage on cash flow for the migrating company not be removed, even though 
the payment is deferred. It could be argued that the taxpayer has a benefit in terms of cash flow in the 
Member State to which it transfers its place of management, as a result of higher depreciation costs 
resulting from a step-up on immigration,121 but Reinout Kok has argued that this argument only is 
valid if 1) that member State actually grants a step-up and 2) the tax treatment in the host Member 
State should be irrelevant for the treatment in the Member State of origin. Still, even if a migrating 
company in theory is given the option between immediate and deferred payment of the exit tax, the 
reality may be that neither of the options are more attractive than the other.  
 
Future decreases in value are also treated differently in the National Grid Indus case compared to the 
ECJ´s decision in the N case. Contrary to the N case are the valuation of assets that are subject to tax at 
119 Ibid., paragraph 73. 
120 Reinout Kok “Exit Taxes for Companies in the European Union after National Grid Indus” ec Tax 
Review 2012-4, 2012 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, p. 200-206, at p. 205. 
121 Reinout Kok “Exit Taxes for Companies in the European Union after National Grid Indus” ec Tax 
Review 2012-4, 2012 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands, å. 200-206, at p. 205. See 
S.c.W Douma in zijn not onder National Grid Indus, BNB 2012/40. He is of the view that calculating 
interest is, for that reason, nut unreasonable. 
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the time of the transfer, and the Member State of origin is not obliged to take into account decreases in 
value. This was not found to be disproportionate as the Member State of origin after the transfer had 
lost its connection wit the assets of the company and therefore also the power of taxation on the value 
of such assets. Hence was it up to the other Member State to take into account any possible value 
decreases by granting step-up, but it was not an obligation. The ECJ decision in this regard appears to 
be contrary to the opinion of the Commission and the Council uttered in respectively the 
Communication on exit taxation122 and the resolution,123 which the Member States should cooperate to 
avoid double taxation, by taking any possible value fluctuations into account. One may also raise the 
question whether the ECJ actually want migrating individual taxpayers to be stronger protected than 
migrating companies.  
 
The next case on exit taxes was the Commission v. Spain124 case on emigrating individuals. The 
Commission claimed that Spain failed to fulfil its obligations under the TEC regarding free movement 
of citizens and workers and freedom of establishment125, and the EEA-Agreement126 regarding free 
movement of workers and freedom of establishment. Initially the ECJ pointed out that free movement 
of citizens is a general right that is specified in article 45 and 49 TFEU, hence will it first consider the 
legislation opposed to article 45 and 49 TFEU and then article 21.127 The Spanish legislation at issue 
required that any income that not previously had been charged income tax were to be levied tax in the 
last year in which the taxpayer who became a non-resident, was considered a Spanish tax resident. The 
fact that the Spanish legislation regarded taxation of income that had already been realised but not yet 
charged tax, makes the case different from the ECJs earlier cases about exit taxes.  
 
The ECJ found that although the Spanish legislation did not prevent a taxpayer resident in Spain to 
exercise his rights secured by the freedom of movement of workers and the freedom of establishment, 
was it nonetheless a restriction as it made moving cross-border less attractive.128 Taxpayers moving 
cross border were treated disadvantageous in terms of cash flow, compared to taxpayers that continued 
to be Spanish tax residents.129 The Spanish provisions were therefore found to be liable to obstruct the 
exercise of the freedoms.130 Further the ECJ continued to examine whether the Spanish legislation 
122 COM/2006/0825: Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee – Exit taxation and the need for co-ordination of 
Member States´ tax policies. 
123 Council Resolution on coordination exit taxation, 2911th ECONOMIC and FINANCIAL 
AFFAIRS, Brussels, 2 December 2008. 
124 Case C-269/09 “European Commission v. Kingdom of Spain” 2012 
125 TEC articles 18, 39 and 43. Now articles 21, 45 and 49 TFEU. 
126 EEA-Agreement articles 28 and 31. 
127 Ibid., paragraph 49. 
128 Ibid., paragraph 56.  
129 Ibid., paragraph 59. 
130 Ibid., paragraph 61. 
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could be justified. The effective recovery of tax debts, the balanced allocation between the Member 
States of powers of taxation and the need to preserve the coherence of the tax system was discussed as 
justifying objectives, but neither of the objectives were accepted in order to justify the legislation. 
Immediate taxation was not necessary to attain any of the mentioned objectives.131 In relation to 
effective recovery of the tax cited the ECJ the National Grid Indus case, and repeated that the 
cooperation mechanisms existing at EU level were sufficient to enable the Member State of origin to 
recover the tax debt in another Member State.132 The ECJ implies here that it upholds the distinction 
between definitive establishment of the amount of the tax and time of recovery.   
 
As regards the existence of a restriction of the free movement of citizens came the ECJ to the same 
conclusion based on the same reasons; that the Spanish legislation was a restriction also to the free 
movement of citizens.133  
 
The question of whether there was an infringement of the EEA-Agreement on the other hand, was 
dismissed. The ECJ found that the Spanish legislation constituted a restriction but it was justified, as 
Spain did not have any cooperation agreements with the three EFTA states on exchange of 
information.134 Therefore it was both proportionate and necessary to charge an immediate exit tax to 
ensure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision and the prevention of tax avoidance.135  
 
In this judgement, the ECJ did follow its earlier case law on exit taxes imposed on individuals, and it 
did not mention neither guarantees nor charge of interest, as done in the National Grid Indus case.  
 
The following case, Commission v. Portugal,136 was the question whether the Portuguese exit tax 
regime infringed the freedom of establishment. Under the Portuguese legislation was a company that 
transferred its seat of effective management or assets or liabilities to another Member States, taxed on 
unrealised capital gains, contrary to a company that made similar transactions within Portugal. The 
ECJ found that the different fiscal treatment clearly caused an obstacle to the freedom of 
establishment, as companies making cross-border transactions were penalised financially compared 
with similar companies that maintains its activities in Portuguese territory.137 However, the ECJ did 
not find that the Portuguese provision that provided taxation in a situation where the cessation of 
activity on Portuguese territory was contrary to the freedom of establishment, as there was no different 
131 Ibid., paragraph 90. 
132 Ibid., paragraph 68-69. 
133 Ibid., paragraph 93. 
134 Ibid., paragraph 96-98. 
135 Ibid., paragraph 99. 
136 Case C-38/10 “European Commission v. Portugal” (2012) 
137 Ibid., paragraph 28.  
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treatment between situations falling within the scope of article 49 and purely domestic situations.138 
Then the ECJ assessed whether the restriction could be justified by legitimate objectives and if it was 
proportionate. The ECJ cited the National Grid Indus case and repeated that article 49 TFEU 
precludes legislation of a Member State which prescribes the immediate recovery of tax on unrealised 
capital gains relating to assets of a company transferring its place of effective management to another 
Member State at the very time of the transfer.139 Furthermore, the different fiscal treatment of 
companies transferring cross-border and companies that maintains their activity within the Member 
State could not be justified by the fact that they are objectively different situations. Moreover would it 
be less harmful to the freedom of establishment if the Member States gave the transferring company 
the choice between immediate and deferred payment of the tax, possibly together with interest in 
accordance with national law. The same conclusion had to be made for taxation of unrealised capital 
gains relating to assets of a PE situated in Portuguese territory that was transferred to another Member 
State as well.140  
 
This judgement is pretty straightforward and ECJ upheld its decision from the National Grid Indus 
case, also regarding the possibility to charge interest. It is clear that charge of exit taxes is a 
disadvantage for the company transferring activities cross border and constitutes a violation of article 
49 TFEU. In addition, immediate taxation is prohibited in so far as the company is not given the 
choice to defer the payment.  
 
In the case Commission v. the Netherlands141 was the Dutch exit tax regime again at issue, and the 
Commission argued that it was violating the freedom of establishment.142  143  Under the Dutch 
legislation was a taxpayer (company or individual) that transferred its place of management to another 
Member State, including a Member State of the EEA, charged an immediate tax on unrealised capital 
gains at the time of the transfer. The ECJ found, based on the proportionality test set out in the 
National Grid Indus case, that the Dutch legislation was a restriction to the freedom of establishment 
as long as the taxpayer who transferred activities to another Member State had a different fiscal 
treatment than taxpayers who maintained their business in the Netherlands.144 Further was it not 
proportionate to require immediate payment of the tax, in order to safeguard the allocation of taxation 
powers between Member States.   
 
138 Ibid., paragraph 30. 
139 Ibid., paragraph 31 et seq. 
140 Ibid., paragraph 34. 
141 Case C-301/11 “Commission européenne contre Royaume des Pays-Bas” 2013. 
142 This case is a continuation of the infringement proceedings against the Netherlands that started with 
the “National Grid Indus case” in 2011. 
143 Case C-301/11 “Commission européenne contre Royaume des Pays-Bas” 2013, paragraph 23. 
144 Ibid., paragraph 14. 
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This decision was also rather forthright and respected the National Grid Indus case. The judgment did 
not come as a surprise, as the Netherlands following the National Grid Indus case had recognised the 
need to amend its exit tax legislation. Still, it had failed to amend its legislation in timely manner and 
consequently did the ECJ find that it had failed to fulfil its obligations under the Treaties. The ECJ 
pointed out in the judgement that although the Netherlands had acknowledged the violation, was it not 
relevant to the result of the infringement proceedings, as the important factor was the content of the 
law at the time of the infringement proceeding.  
 
The Commission v. Spain145 case concerned the Spanish exit taxation regime. Under the Spanish law 
was a taxpayer that transferred his residence from Spain to another Member State, or stopped the 
activities of a PE in Spain or transferred assets from this PE in Spain to another Member State charged 
an exit tax on unrealised capital gains. Similar transactions made within Spain had no immediate tax 
consequences. The ECJ had to assess whether the provisions infringed the freedom of establishment 
confer article 39 TFEU. The ECJ found that taxpayers that became non-residents or transferred 
activities to another Member State was treated disadvantageous compared to taxpayers that made the 
same transactions within Spanish territory, because of the different fiscal treatment.146 Although the 
Spanish law did not prohibit migration or transfers abroad, was it still likely that such transferred 
would be considered less attractive and thus prevent cross border activities. The different treatment 
could not be justified by the fact that the situation was objectively different.147 However, the ECJ 
found that the Spanish provision that charged a tax in a situation where a PE ceased it’s activities in 
Spain was not treated differently from a purely domestic situation, and therefore did not constitute a 
restriction to the freedom of establishment.148  Then the ECJ continued to examine whether the 
legislation could be justified.149 The ECJ restated that it was within the right of the fiscal competence 
of the Member States to tax unrealised capital gains that had accrued within its territory when a 
company migrates and/or transfer assets. Immediate taxation was, however, not proportionate, as there 
are less restrictive measures available e.g. the mutual assistance directives. The ECJ concluded that the 
Spanish legislation, which levied immediate tax on companies transferring their residence or assets to 
another Member State, was contrary to the freedom of establishment.150  
 
This judgment is in line with National Grid Indus and later judgments on exit taxes charged on 
companies.  
 
145 Case C-64/11 “Commission européenne contre Royaume d´Espagne” 2013 
146 Ibid., paragraph 22 et seq.  
147 Ibid., paragraph 29. 
148 Ibid., paragraph 30. Citation of the “Commission v. Portugal” case. 
149 Ibid., paragraph 31 et seq.  
150 Ibid., paragraph 40. 
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In the Commission v. Denmark151 case was the Danish exit taxation regime at issue. Under Danish 
legislation was an exit tax charged on the unrealised capital gains of assets that where transferred to 
another Member State of the EU or a third country, that were part of the EEA-Agreement. The 
Commission argued that this was contrary to the freedom of establishment confer article 49 TFEU and 
article 31 of the EEA-Agreement. The ECJ examined first the legislation opposed to article 49 TFEU, 
then to article 31 of the EEA-Agreement. Initially noted the ECJ that all restrictions to freedom of 
establishments are prohibited confer article 49 TFEU, and that it follows from this freedom that 
companies are to be ensured national treatment both by their home state and host state.152 National 
measures that make it less attractive to exercise this freedom are to be considered restrictions.153 The 
ECJ found that the Danish legislation was a restriction to article 49 TFEU, as taxpayers transferring 
assets to another Member State became subject to a tax that not was triggered in similar domestic 
situations. The different treatment was likely to make cross-border transfers less attractive, and the 
different treatment could not be explained by the fact that they the situations were objectively 
different.154  
 
Further the ECJ considered whether the Danish provisions could be justified and if it was 
proportionate.155 Firstly the ECJ cited the National Grid Indus case and stated that immediate exit 
taxation on unrealised capital gains of assets in a company that transfers its seat of management to 
another Member State are disproportionate to safeguard the objective of ensuring coherence in the 
national tax system. Denmark had claimed that the ECJ in its decision in the National Grid Indus 
case156 had presumed that the transferred assets actually was realised, and further that when the tax of 
unrealised capital gains was triggered by assets that was not supposed to be realised after the transfer, 
was it consequently proportionate according to the objective - of ensuring the allocation of taxation 
powers between Member States – to collect the tax at the time when the company transferred its assets 
to another Member State.157 Such a narrow interpretation was clearly rejected by the ECJ. However, 
the ECJ stated that in a situation where a transferred asset possibly not would be sold when it arrived 
151 Case C-261/11 “Europa-Kommissionen mod Kongeriget Danmark” 2013  
152 Ibid., paragraph 25 et seq. 
153 Ibid., paragraph 27. Citation of the “National Grid Indus” case. 
154 Ibid., paragraph 30-31. Citation of the “Commission v. Portugal” case. 
155 Ibid., paragraph 32.  
156 Case C-371/10 “National Grid Indus BV v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond/kantoor 
Rotterdam” 2011, ECR I-0000, paragraphs 68 and 70. In short that deferred payment of the tax debt 
until the time of actual realisation of the capital gains will avoid the cash flow problems that come 
with immediate recovery. However, the asset situation of a company may appear so complex that an 
accurate cross-border tracing of the destiny of the assets until they are realised, can constitute an 
excessive burden for the company in question. 
157 Case C-261/11 “Europa-Kommissionen mod Kongeriget Danmark” 2013, paragraph 33 et seq. 
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to the host state, would that not in itself make the home state loose its power to collect the tax debt, 
which had been finally established at the time of the transfer.158 The ECJ stated in paragraph 37 that: 
 
 “The Member States – which are entitled to tax capital gains that have accrued while the assets in 
question were located within their territory – are therefore entitled to provide an alternative criterion 
for the taxation than the actual disposal in order to ensure the taxation of assets, which are not 
intended to be realised, and that are less restrictive of the freedom of establishment than taxation at 
the time of the transfer.”159  
 
The EJ clearly stated that the conclusion from the National Grid Indus case comprises all assets and 
that the Member States are entitled to provide an alternative criterion for recovery of the tax, other 
than at the time the asset is sold. This is nonetheless limited to assets that are not expected to be 
realised. Further, the ECJ stated that it was up to the Member States themselves to decide on the 
alternative criterion, because the tax debt nevertheless was finally established at the time of the 
transfer.160 The ECJ concluded that the Danish legislation infringed article 49 TFEU.  
 
Next the ECJ examines whether the Danish legislation violated article 31 of the EEA-Agreement. The 
ECJ remarked initially that article 31 of the EEA-Agreement is identical with article 49 TFEU, and 
that they must be interpreted identically. However, case law of the Union regarding restrictions on the 
right of free movement within the Union cannot be transmitted in its entirety to the freedoms, which 
are guaranteed by the EEA-Agreement, as the exercise of these freedoms form part of a different legal 
context.161 The ECJ found that the Danish provision was a restriction to the freedom of establishment 
confer article 31 of the EEA-Agreement. Then the ECJ continued to assess whether the restriction 
could be justified by the objective to ensure effective recovery of the tax, and if the provision was 
proportionate and necessary.162 First the ECJ remarked that the Danish provision covered transfer of 
assets from a PE for a company that was established on Danish territory, thus would such a company 
maintain to be subject to Danish tax jurisdiction. The transfer in itself would therefore have no effect 
on Denmark’s possibility to collect the necessary information for the tax debt to be determined, and to 
recover the claim if the company not voluntary paid the owed debt. In this situation was it thus not 
necessary to make use of a scheme concerning tax assistance, which the third country that was a part 
of the EEA-Agreement, had assigned to. The ECJ found consequently that the Danish provision 
violated article 31 of the EEA-Agreement.     
 
158 Ibid., paragraph 36. 
159 The authors own translation. 
160 Ibid., paragraph 38. 
161 Ibid., paragraph 44. 
162 Ibid., paragraph 46. 
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This case concerned both article 49 TFEU and article 31 of the EEA-Agreement, and the Danish 
legislation was found to be a restriction to both. The ECJ stated that to justify such a restriction was it 
already clear from previous case law that immediate exit taxes goes beyond what is necessary, in order 
to ensure the coherence of the national tax system. Yet, the ECJ did add a new important element 
regarding the proportionality of exit tax regimes. The ECJ expressed clearly that the conclusion from 
the National Grid Indus case applies to all assets also those that were not intended to be disposed.163 
The Member States are however entitled to provide an alternative criterion in order to collect the tax 
debt from such assets. This is though an exception as the rule is that deferral must be offered for all 
assets until the capital gain is realised. The ECJ did not give any examples of what could be an 
alternative criterion, but the criteria had to be less restrictive than immediate payment. Neither an 
obligation to provide securities nor the possibility to apply interest charges was mentioned in this case.  
 
The ECJ´s most recent case on exit taxes is the DMC Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH v. Finanzamt 
Hamburg-Mitte164, which was published in January this year. The case concerned a reorganisation 
under German law, and the core facts were that two Austrian corporate partners, in a German limited 
partnership, exchanged their partnership interests with a German company in return for shares in the 
latter. Germany did not have right to tax the capital gains on the shares received because of a double 
tax treaty with Austria. Yet, the German tax authorities issued a tax assessment to the German 
company in which they taxed the interests contributed by the two Austrian companies at their concern 
value, not at their book value, thus giving rise to taxation of the unrealised capital gains on the 
interests transferred to the German company. If the partners had been German residents would the 
assets have been transferred at book their value. The German law did however provide for an optional 
interest-free deferral of the payment over a five-year period, as long as security was provided. The 
German tax court of Hamburg asked for a preliminary ruling, and the questions that were asked were 
in short if it was compatible with the freedom of establishment to I) tax the unrealised capital gains on 
assets contributed to a capital company at their concern value and II) offer an interest-free five- year 
deferral of the tax debt, as long it was provided security for the payment.    
 
Initially the ECJ examined what Treaty freedom the German provision should be linked. All the 
interested parties, also the referring court, agreed that the facts of the case had to be connected to the 
freedom of establishment. The Commission on the other hand was of the view that the German 
provision had to fall within the scope of the free movement of capital confer article 63 TFEU. The 
ECJ found, after assessing the purpose and application of the German provision, that the more relevant 
freedom was free movement of capital.165  
163 Ibid., paragraph 37. 
164 Case C-164/12 “DMC Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH v. Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte” 2014. 
165 Ibid., paragraphs 28-38.  
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Then the ECJ continued to consider whether the German provision constituted a restriction to article 
63 TFEU. The ECJ found, citing the National Grid Indus case, that the German legislation constituted 
a restriction that in principle was prohibited by article 63 TFEU, as investors that no longer were liable 
to tax in Germany was disadvantageously treated in the terms of cash flow, compared to investors that 
maintained to be German taxpayers.166 Further, the different treatment could not be explained by the 
fact that they were objectively different. Next the ECJ assessed whether the restriction could be 
justified by overriding reasons in the public interest.167 According to the German court was the 
purpose of the German provision to ensure the balanced allocation of taxation powers between 
Member States in accordance with the principle of territoriality. Germany sought to exercise its power 
to tax capital gains generated in its territory that, as a consequence of a bilateral agreement, could not 
be taxed by Germany at the time when the capital gains were actually realised.168 The ECJ remarked 
that the preservation of the balanced allocation of taxation powers between Member States was a 
legitimate objective, and that in the absence of any unifying or harmonising measures of the EU, had 
the Member States retained the power to define how to allocate such powers.169 Citing the cases 
National Grid Indus and Commission v. Denmark, did the ECJ find that the German provision could 
be justified, as for the fact that the conversion of an interest in a limited partnership into shares in a 
capital company had the effect of removing income from the Member State where the income was 
generated, as long as the amount of payable tax was established at the time of the conversion.170 On 
the other hand, the objective of preserving the balanced allocation of taxation powers could only 
justify legislation such as the German provision if the home state actually was prevented from 
exercising its power to tax such income.171 In this case was the ECJ unsure whether Germany actually 
lost its power to tax the partnership interests at issue, and stated that it was for the national court to 
determine whether Germany would actually lose its taxing rights or not in this case.172 Hence 
concluded the ECJ that the restriction could be justified by the objective of preserving the balanced 
allocation of taxing rights between the Member States. 
 
The second question concerned whether the German legislation at issue went beyond what was 
necessary to attain the objective of preserving the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes 
between Member States, having regard, in particular to the deferral provided for under the German 
provision. Initially the ECJ notes that it is proportionate for the Member States to determine the tax on 
166 Ibid., paragraphs 40-43.  
167 Ibid., paragraphs 44. 
168 Ibid., paragraphs 45.  
169 Ibid., paragraphs 44-47. 
170 Ibid., paragraph 55. 
171 Ibid., paragraph 56. 
172 Ibid., paragraph 57-58. 
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unrealised capital gains at the time when the Member States taxation powers ceases to exist.173 Yet, in 
regard to the collection of the tax found the ECJ, while citing the cases National Grid Indus and 
Commission v. Portugal, that the taxpayer should have the choice between immediate payment and 
deferred payment, possibly together with interest in accordance with national law.174 The ECJ found 
that the German provision was proportionate in order to attain the objective, as it provided for the 
option to spread the payment of the tax debt over a period of five years and without having to pay 
interests, since the risk of non-recovery increases over time.175 Additionally, the ECJ did also find that 
the risk of non-recovery could justify the requirement of a bank guarantee. The ECJ stated however 
that as such guarantees in themselves constitute a restrictive effect, can they not be imposed without 
prior assessment of the risk of non-recovery.176 Consequently concluded the ECJ that the German 
legislation did not go beyond what was necessary, and thus was it compatible with article 63 TFEU.    
 
Overall, the judgement is in line with the ECJ´s previous cases on exit taxes charged on companies. 
Reorganisation was treated the same as migration, as the unrealised capital gains of the partnership 
assets, because of the exchange, were removed from German tax jurisdiction. The ECJ accepted that 
the assets market value was used to calculate the tax, and the deferral provided under German law was 
proportionate. Opposed to the ECJ previous case law on exit taxes was the freedom at issue in this 
case article 63 TFEU; free movement of capital. Then again, the ECJ´s examination of the case at 
issue is similar to the examination done in preceding exit tax cases, where the relevant freedoms have 
been freedom of establishment or freedom of movement.  
 
The main question within the case was whether the deferral method chosen was proportionate: a five-
year interest-free deferral if security is provided, instead of a pending deferral that is to be paid at the 
time when the capital gain is realised. Initially, as found in the National Grid Indus case, can it be 
proportionate for a Member State to levy an exit tax when a taxpayer or asset ceases to be subject to 
the Member States tax jurisdiction, for the purpose of maintaining a balanced allocation of taxing 
powers. Still, the taxpayer must have the choice between immediate- and deferred taxation. The idea 
was that the administrative burden connected to tracing the assets and proving their existence, could 
ought weight the disadvantage of having to pay the tax at the time of the transfer, and that in such a 
case would immediate taxation be as proportionate as deferral. The problem arises when the assets in 
question typically not will be sold. This issue has been up for discussion earlier177, but the ECJ have 
refrained from giving a clear answer. In this case however, the ECJ found that as the risk of non-
173 Ibid., paragraph 60. 
174 Ibid., paragraph 61. 
175 Ibid., paragraph 62-64. 
176 Ibid., paragraph 65 et seq. 
177 Advocat-General Kokott´s opinion to the ”National Grid Indus” case and the ”Denmark v. 
Commission” case. 
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recovery increases over time was it both proportionate and satisfactory to spread the payment of the 
tax over a period of five years. The ECJ does not say why exactly five years are a proportionate 
solution. Yet, if a deferral of five year is accepted, a deferral over a longer period should be accepted 
as well, as it would be less burdensome for the taxpayer.  
 
The mechanism of a phased deferral seems to have been accepted because of the fact that some capital 
gains are realised over time, as they are depreciated. Normally when deferral is given is the tax to be 
paid at the time of disposal. Still, if the asset at hand is typically not is disposed is the risk of non-
recovery evident. Thus, it can be proportionate to provide a phased deferral, in order to attain the 
objective of a balanced allocation of taxation powers.  
 
The German provision required providing of security, in order to be granted deferral. The ECJ referred 
to the risk of non-recovery also here, to justify this requirement. Yet, the ECJ stated clearly that as a 
matter of principle could guarantees not be required, without a prior assessment of the risk of non-
recovery. The ECJ did give some implicit guidelines on how this assessment should be made; the risk 
of non-recovery must be assessed in the light if the unrealised capital gains and the form of asset. In 
this case was the assets, namely shares in a German capital company, held by two companies 
registered in Austria, considered to be such a situation that could justify the requirement to provide 
security. In this case was the number of assets limited to one type of assets, but it is not clear of this 
implies the need for security or not.   
 
Post this judgment is there still outstanding questions regarding charge of exit taxes, mainly regarding 
charge of interest and subsequent value increases. The German law in this case provided an interest-
free deferral, but to this was only mentioned by the ECJ. The issue regarding subsequent value drops 




From preceding case law is it clear that exit taxes constitute an infringement of the freedom of 
establishment in article 49 TFEU, free movement of capital in article 63 TFEU and article 31 of the 
EEA-Agreement. It is also clear that an exit tax can be accepted in order to attain the objective of the 
balanced allocation of taxation powers between the Member States, in accordance to the principle of 
territoriality linked to the temporal component, as the Member States simply exercise its power to tax 
capital gains that has accrued within its territory.178 The main issue concerning exit taxes is that the tax 
must not go beyond what is necessary to attain the pursued objective, i.e. the tax must be both 
178 See the cases “National Grid Indus” C-371/10 paragraph 45-47 and “Commission v. Spain” C-
64/11 paragraph 31.   
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proportionate. When considering whether an exit tax is proportionate or not, it must be made a 
distinction between establishment of the tax debt and the recovery of the tax. It is proportionate to 
establish the tax debt at the time the taxpayer or asset exits the home states tax jurisdiction, and ignore 
changes in value of the assets after the exit.179 However, to always require immediate recovery of the 
tax debt is disproportionate. In order to be proportionate must the national legislation offer a company 
the choice between immediate- and deferred recovery of the tax debt.180 Immediate payment may 
create a disadvantage for the company in the terms of cash flow, but the company will avoid the 
administrative burden that is connected with deferred payment, hereunder tracing the assets.   
 
The ECJ has also found that it is possible for the Member States to charge interest in accordance with 
national law and to ask for security for the payment in order to grant deferral. Yet, it is still uncertain 
under what conditions such requirements can be proportionate. In the DMC Beteiligungsgesellschaft 
mbH v. Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte expressed the ECJ that as a matter of principle could guarantees 
not required without a prior assessment of the risk of non-recovery i.e. guarantees cannot be a fixed 
requirement but can be accepted after an individual assessment of the case at hand. In this case the 
EJC did also give some guidelines in regard of deferral e.g. that a phased interest-free deferral over 
fiver years if security is provided, could be proportionate. Nevertheless, under what conditions deferral 
can be granted is still not clear.  
 
4.1.3. The EU´s ability to adopt legislation in the area of exit taxes  
 
EU- law and the ECJ have had a great impact on the Member States ability to impose exit taxes on 
companies, though have it not yet been produced any EU legislation directly addressing exit taxes 
applied on companies. It is likely to think that this is because the Union lacks legislative powers, but 
that is not the case. It is correct that there have never been an explicit legal base for harmonisation of 
neither direct tax in general nor exit tax charged on companies in particular, but the EU has still the 
power to interfere. The TFEU contains several flexi- clauses that can be used as legislative bases in 
order to adopt harmonising legislation to ensure the functioning of the Internal Market. The relevant 
articles here are article 115 to article 117 and article 352 TFEU. Article 115 and article 352 are yet the 
only articles that have been used as legal base for harmonisation of direct taxes and their use are 
strictly controlled by the ECJ.181 Neither of the articles has been used to harmonise exit taxation of 
companies though, and in this part will I discuss the reasons for this.  
179 See the cases “National Grid Indus” C-371/10 paragraph 86, Commission v. the Netherlands 
301/11 paragraph 16, “Commission v. Spain” C-64/11 paragraph 31, Commission v. Denmark 261/11 
paragraph 32.  
180 See the cases “National Grid Indus” C-371/10 paragraph 86, “Commission v. the Netherlands” 
301/11 paragraph 16, “Commission v. Portugal” C-38/10 paragraph 32.  
181 Christiana Hji Panayi ”European Union Corporate Tax Law” p. 3. 
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Article 115 states that “the Council shall, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative 
procedure and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, 
issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the 
Member States as directly affect the establishment of the internal market.” This article gives the 
Council, on certain conditions, the right to issue legislation that directly affects formation of the 
internal market.  
 
Article 352 (1) states that “if action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the 
policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties 
have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate 
measures…” National Parliaments must be informed about proposals based on this article.182 Article 
352 is a flexibility clause, and is only to be used when actions from the Union are proved to be 
necessary in order to achieve its objectives.   
 
Article 116 states that “where the Commission finds that a difference between the provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States is distorting the conditions of 
competition in the internal market and the resultant distortion needs to be eliminated, it shall consult 
the Member States concerned.” If the distortion is not eliminated the European Parliament and the 
Council can issue necessary directives in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure. Article 
116 addresses existing distortion affecting the conditions of competition in the internal market, and 
authorises the Union legislators to adopt necessary legislation to eliminate the market distortion. This 
legislative base does not require unanimity and the legislative process is based on the ordinary 
legislative procedure.  
 
Article 117 (1) states “where it is a reason to fear that the adoption or amendment of a provision laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action may cause distortion within the meaning of Article 
116, a Member State desiring to proceed therewith shall consult the Commission. After consulting the 
Member States, the Commission shall recommend to the States concerned such measures as may be 
appropriate to avoid the distortion in question.” If the State in question does not comply with the 
recommendation addressed to it by the Commission, shall other Member States not be required to 
amend their own provisions in order to eliminate such distortion. Article 117 intends at preventing the 
Member States from introducing new market distortions. Article 117 does, contrary to article 116, not 
authorise the Union to adopt legislation in order to prevent new distortions but only permits the 
182 Art 352 TFEU (2).  
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Commission to issue recommendations. Recommendations have now binding force.183 Article 117 has 
the objective of a standstill clause, but the Member States are still obligated to cooperate in order to 
ensure the objectives of the Union, confer art 4 (3) TFEU, which is an important principle, especially 
in tax matters.  
 
These legislative bases gives the EU institutions power to intervene in order to protect the functioning 
of the Internal Market. Still, none of the articles have been used yet in order to regulate the Member 
States national rules for charging exit tax on companies, although the ECJ have found that such 
regimes are likely to infringe Internal Market principles. A central issue here is the fiscal veto, which 
is the power of each of the Member States to reject to a harmonising measure in direct tax law.184 The 
general rule confer the Treaties is that all Member States must agree unanimously to tax proposals, 
before they can be adopted.185 The Member States safeguard their veto right carefully, and it has 
survived several Treaty amendments and attempts to move to qualified majority voting.186 As an 
example, it was proposed to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting for proposals in a 
limited number of tax fields, essentially proposals necessary for the proper operation of the internal 
market, in the draft of the Constitutional Treaty.187 All Member States did not ratify the Constitutional 
Treaty, and the Treaty of Lisbon was later drafted to replace it. The Commissions proposal was not in 
the new treaty. The Member States are evidently unwilling to give up parts of their sovereignty in 
direct taxation matters.  
 
Only article 115 and article 352 (1) are dependent on unanimity. Article 116 on the other hand gives 
the European Parliament and the Council, on certain conditions, power to issue legislation based on 
ordinary legislative procedure in order to cope with distortions in competition because of national 
legislation. The article in itself appears to be a suitable legal base for the EU legislator to intervene in 
national exit taxation regimes that infringes EU competition law, but it has not happened yet. Article 
116 is aggressive, as it gives the EU legislators power to issue legislation in order to eliminate 
distortion on competition based on regular legislative procedure, if the Member State in question do 
not remove the distortion itself. In addition are interventions from the EU institutions in matters that 
are supposed to be sovereign to the Member States extremely politically sensitive. This may be the 
reason for why article 115 and article 352 are the only ones that have been used for legislation in 
direct tax matters, as they are based on unanimity and that legislation based on these articles 
183 TFEU art. 288 in fine.  
184 Christiana Hji Panayi ”European Union Corporate Tax Law” p. 4. 
185 Taxation and Qualified Majority Voting, The Intergovernmental Conference of 2003-2004 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/conference/index_en.htm (23.04.14) 
186 Christiana Hji Panayi ”European Union Corporate Tax Law” p. 4. 
187 See amendments to the draft constitution proposed by the Commission, Article III-63 (corporate 
taxation) at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/amendments_iii_63_en.pdf 
(23.04.14) 
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consequently will have broader legitimacy in regard of both Member States and EU citizens. Yet, it 
does not explain why the EU legislators have refrained from using article 115 and article 352 to issue 
legislation in order to harmonise national exit taxation regimes.  
 
4.2 The legality of applying exit taxes on companies within the EEA 
 
4.2.1 The legal framework for charge of exit taxes on companies within the EEA 
 
Exit taxes as such are not specifically addressed in the EEA-Agreement, but the EEA States exit 
taxation regimes have nonetheless been influenced by the agreement. The EEA States are bound to 
take any appropriate measure, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations 
arising out of the agreement, and they shall abstain from any measure that could jeopardize the 
attainment of the objectives of the agreement.188 In other words, the EEA States are obliged to 
safeguard the objectives set out by the agreement and to take any necessary actions in order to make 
them effective. The concept of homogeneity is of great importance, and the objective is that the parties 
are to have an as uniform interpretation as possible of the provisions of the agreement and those 
provisions of EU law which are substantially reproduced in the agreement.  
 
As we have seen from the case law of the ECJ, are charge of exit taxes on companies likely to create 
restrictions to freedoms protected by the EU Treaties and the EEA-Agreement, in particular the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital. The free movement of persons, services 
and capital, hereunder the freedom of establishment, are identically set out in the EU Treaties and the 
EEA-Agreement, and the provisions shall be interpreted in the same way.189 In other words, a measure 
that is found to be a restriction to the EEA-Agreement must also be seen as a restriction confer the EU 
Treaties. The case law of the EU concerning restrictions to the free movement within the Union can 
though not be implemented in its entirety to the freedoms guaranteed by the EEA-Agreement, as the 
EEA-Agreement covers a different legal context.190 Nevertheless, the ECJ has had a big impact on the 
EEA States exit taxation regimes and the case law mentioned above are relevant also when 
determining the legality of charging exit taxes on companies within the EEA. Although is it necessary 
to keep in mind that the EU and the EEA are two different legal contexts.  
   
An important difference in relation to the legality of exit taxes within the EU and the EEA is that the 
EEA States, which are not EU Member States, are not subject to the Mutual Assistance Directive for 
the Recovery of Taxes or the Mutual Assistance Directive for Exchange of Information. Both 
188 The EEA-Agreement article 3. 
189 Ibid. article 6. 
190 Case C-261/11 “Europa-Kommissionen mod Kongeriget Danmark” 2013, paragraph 44. 
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directives have been referred to by the ECJ in several cases about exit taxes, in connection to the 
necessity of a restrictive measure as part of the proportionality test used to determine whether a 
restriction can be justified or not. The effect of this will I come back to.  
 
4.2.2. The case law of the EFTA Court  
 
Firstly will I remark that the EFTA Court has jurisdiction of over cases regarding Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway’s compliance with the EEA-Agreement, and that the EFTA Court is bound 
to take regard to jurisprudence from the ECJ.  
 
Arcade Drilling AS v. Norway191 is the only case the EFTA Court has had concerning exit taxes. The 
facts of the case where that Arcade Drilling AS (Arcade), a company incorporated and registered as a 
Norwegian limited liability company was deemed to have moved its head office i.e. real seat, and its 
tax residency to the UK in 2001. The Norwegian tax authorities claimed that Arcade, as a consequence 
of the relocation of the company’s head office outside of Norway, was under an obligation to liquidate 
and pay off a liquidation tax.192 Arcade had however de facto not been liquidated and the obligation to 
liquidate according to Norwegian company legislation was disputed. Arcade filed for a legal 
annulment action and claimed that the decision at issue infringed EEA law. The case was brought 
before the Oslo municipal court, which requested an advisory opinion from the EFTA Court. As for 
the fact that Arcade not yet had been liquidated, was the questions referred formulated on the 
assumption that a liquidation obligation existed under Norwegian law.  
 
The first question referred was whether it constituted a restriction pursuant to the articles 31 and 34 of 
the EEA-Agreement to impose liquidation tax on a company, if national company law entails an 
obligation to liquidate the company because the company has relocated its de facto head office from 
Norway to another EEA State. Initially the EFTA Court remarked that in the absence of clear and 
precise provisions on the obligation to liquidate, and of any decision by the competent authorities or 
courts putting the liquidation into effect, was Arcade still a company established under the legislation 
of an EEA State in accordance with article 34 and was thus able to rely on the freedom of 
establishment confer article 31.193  
 
Then the EFTA Court continued to consider breach of the articles 31 and 34. The EFTA Court stated 
first that freedom of establishment under article 31 entails a right for companies formed in accordance 
with the law of an EEA State having its registered office, central administration or principal place of 
191 ”Arcade Drilling AS v Staten v/Skatt vest” case E-15/11 
192 Ibid., paragraph 28-29.  
193 Ibid., paragraph 45. 
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business within the EEA, to purse their activities in another EEA State through a branch established 
there.194 Then, article 31 is, despite of its wording, not only intended to secure the benefit of national 
treatment in a host State, but also prohibits the home State from hindering its own nationals or 
companies incorporated under its legislation, to establish in another EEA State.195 Further does it 
follow from the prohibition of discrimination in article 31 that comparable situations must not be 
treated differently, and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such 
treatment is objectively justified.196  
 
The national legal basis used to impose the liquidation tax was the general anti-avoidance principles. 
The Norwegian State argued that the principles applied in the same manner to the taxation of all 
companies that was deemed to be in avoidance of taxation consequent to the winding up and 
liquidation of companies, while Arcade, on the other hand, argued that the principles applied only in 
cross-border situations. The EFTA Court held that it was up to the national court to determine the 
scope of the principles, but if it found that the principles only applied on cross-border situations would 
they constitute a restriction to the articles 31 and 34.197 The EFTA Courts reasoned that if the 
principles only applied to companies transferring its place of management to another EEA State, then 
would this constitute a restriction because of the different treatment, and such difference in treatment 
could not be explained by an objective difference in situation.  
 
The second question referred to the EFTA Court was what criteria would be decisive when 
determining whether the national regulation in question pursued an overriding public interest and 
whether it was suitable and necessary for the attainment of such an interest.198 The EFTA Court stated 
first that a restriction of freedom of establishment only is permissible if it is justified by overriding 
reasons in public interest and that the restriction is appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the 
objective, in addition to that it does not go beyond what is necessary.199 Furthermore, in the absence of 
any unifying or harmonising measures, had the EEA States kept the power to define, by treaty or 
unilaterally, the criteria for allocating their powers of taxation.200 Accordingly could the EEA States 
take appropriate measures with view to preserving the exercise of their tax jurisdiction when a 
company ceases to exits under that jurisdiction as a result of national company law, thus was 
preserving the allocation of taxation powers between the EEA State a legitimate objective.201 The 
EFTA Court also noted that justification on these grounds could be accepted, in particular of the 
194 Ibid., paragraph 58. 
195 Ibid., paragraph 59.  
196 Ibid., paragraph 60.  
197 Ibid., paragraph 61-66.  
198 Ibid., paragraph 67. 
199 Ibid., paragraph 82-83. 
200 Ibid., paragraph 84.  
201 Ibid., paragraph 85. 
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system in question was designed to prevent conduct capable of jeopardising the right of an EEA State 
to exercise its tax jurisdiction in relation to activities carried out in its territory.202  
 
The Norwegian state had claimed that prevention of tax avoidance also could justify the legislation. 
To this the EFTA Court noted that it could be a justifying objective, but only if the legislation was 
especially designed for this matter.203 Furthermore stated the EFTA Court that the EEA State was 
entitled to tax a company’s gains, and assess its tax position at the time when the taxpaying entity was 
dissolved and the gains were distributed to its owners, based on the principle of fiscal territoriality 
linked to a temporal component. In this case could the taxation be justified namely because of the 
taxpayer’s existence as a separate legal entity for tax purposes within national territory during the 
period in which the gains arose and other tax positions become effective.204  
 
The EFTA Court found therefore that if companies were permitted to relocate their head office to 
another EEA State, in violation to national company law, without having any consequences for 
taxation, would this undermine the balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes between the EEA 
States.205 The Norwegian legislation was thus found to enable the Norwegian State to exercise its tax 
jurisdiction in relation to activities carried out in its territory, and to prevent practices whereby 
companies sought to evade taxation obligations.206 Consequently held the EFTA Court that a national 
measure, such as the Norwegian legislation at issue, pursued legitimate objectives that were 
compatible with the EEA-Agreement and constituted overriding reasons in the public interest, and that 
it was appropriate for ensuring the attainment of those objectives.207 
 
Then the EFTA Court assessed whether the Norwegian legislation went beyond what was necessary to 
attain the objectives of maintain the balanced allocation of taxation powers between the EEA States, 
and to prevent tax evasion. Under the Norwegian provision were both the establishment and the 
recovery of the tax at the time when the company was winding up or liquidated. The EFTA Court 
found that the definitive establishment of the tax amount at this time might be proportionate,208 but it 
was not proportionate to require immediate payment of the tax. The EFTA Court cited the National 
Grid Indus case, and held that national tax authorities has to distinguish between definite 
establishment of the tax debt, and the time of recovery.209 Immediate recovery of the tax could give 
rise to a significant disadvantage for the company in the terms of cash flow, and this problem might be 
202 Ibid., paragraph 86. 
203 Ibid., paragraph 87. 
204 Ibid., paragraph 90. 
205 Ibid., paragraph 91.  
206 Ibid., paragraph 92. 
207 Ibid., paragraph 93. 
208 Ibid., paragraph 97-98. 
209 Ibid., paragraph 99.  
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avoided by deferring the payment of the tax until the capital gains were actually realised.210  However, 
the national authorities were found to be entitled to require security for the payment, provided that 
there is a genuine and proven risk of non-recovery.211 Furthermore noted the EFTA Court that 
important factors were the nature and extent of the company´s tax positions, and the sources for 
information available to the national authorities regarding these tax positions, inter alia, through 
cooperation with the other EEA States. If it was found that the assets would be easy to trace, could the 
migrating company be offered the choice between immediate- or deferred payment. The latter could 
however constitute an administrative burden for the company in connection with tracing the relocated 
assets.212 The EFTA Court also noted that account should be taken to the risk of non-recovery of the 
tax, which increases with the passage of time, by the EEA State in question by e.g. require provision 
of a bank guarantee.213  
 
The EFTA Court concluded that definitive establishment of the amount of the tax consequent to an 
obligation to wind up and liquidate a company could be justified by the objectives of maintain the 
balanced allocation of powers of taxation between the EEA States and preventing tax avoidance. A 
national measure that requires immediate recovery of tax on unrealised capital gains at the time of the 
tax assessment was precluded by article 31 of the EEA-Agreement. 
 
This decision is not surprising, as the EFTA Court actively based its decision on the principles already 
set laid down by the ECJ, mainly in the National Grid Indus case.  On the other hand, the EFTA Court 
did also provide some clarifications. First, that a company of a EEA State that uses the real seat 
system is protected by the freedom of establishment, even though it is deemed to be liquidated 
according to company law as long as the liquidation not formally has been put into effect.214 
Furthermore, in regard of the EEA States ability to ask for security when granting deferral, found the 
EFTA Court that it can be unnecessary to ask for security in relation to liquidation of a company, if 
the risk of non-recovery is covered by the personal liability of shareholders for outstanding tax debts 
of the company.215  
 
4.3. Can exit taxes be charged to the same extent within the EU and the EEA?  
 
As mentioned above is it likely that exit taxes levied on companies are allowed to the same extent 
within the EU and the EEA, and the conclusion presented at p. 34 in relation to the discussion about 
210 Ibid., paragraph 100. 
211 Ibid., paragraph 101. 
212 Ibid., paragraph 102-103.  
213 Ibid., paragraph 105.  
214 Ibid., paragraph 45-46.  
215 Ibid., paragraph 105.  
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the ECJ´s case law, could be applicable also in regard of exit taxes imposed on companies within the 
EEA. The fact that the EU and the EEA are two separate legal contexts has that effect that one cannot 
just accept that a restrictive measure under EU law also is restrictive confer the EEA-Agreement. 
When assessing the case law mentioned above is it apparent that the examination of whether an exit 
tax regime constitutes a restriction to a freedom protected by the EU Treaties and/or the EEA-
Agreement, is the same. However the differences become evident under the assessment of whether an 
exit tax regime, which is found to be restrictive, can be justified and is proportionate. The question 
that must be asked is whether the two situations should be treated differently.  
 
The Commission v. Denmark216 case is suitable to demonstrate the difference between the contexts of 
the EU Treaties and the EEA Agreement. In this case considered the ECJ first whether the Danish 
legislation at issue violated the freedom of establishment confer article 49 TFEU, and then if it 
violated the freedom of establishment confer article 31 of the EEA-Agreement. The ECJ found that the 
Danish legislation violated both provisions. Under the assessment of whether the Danish legislation 
constituted a restriction to article 31 of the EEA-Agreement asked the ECJ whether such a restriction, 
in the legal context of the EEA-Agreement, could be justified by overriding reasons in the public 
interest to ensure effective recovery of the tax and further if the restriction would be appropriate to 
ensure the attainment of the objective in question and that it did not go beyond what was necessary to 
attain the objective.217 It had been argued that immediate recovery of the tax could be justified in order 
to ensure effective recovery of the tax, because of the lack of sufficient legislation to ensure mutual 
exchange and recovery of the tax debt between Denmark and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The 
ECJ found essentially that if it were no need of assistance from the EEA State, which was not a EU 
Member, in order to recover the tax then would it be disproportionate to require immediate recovery of 
the tax debt. In the Commission v. Denmark case would the transferred assets continue to be subject to 
Danish tax jurisdiction after the transfer, and thus could the Danish legislation not be justified.  
 
Neither the ECJ nor the EFTA Court has referred to situations where the assistance from an EEA 
State, which is not a EU Member State, has been needed. It is possible however, because of the 
absence of a legal framework for mutual assistance in the area of taxation, that immediate recovery 
could be accepted within the EEA between non-EU Member State or EU Member States and Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway. The purpose to ensure effective tax recovery is a legitimate objective, and 
if the home state would need assistance from the host state in order to attain this objective, and such 
assistance was not available then could immediate recovery be considered both proportionate and 
necessary. Under the consideration of whether the restriction could be justified and if it is necessary 
would one of course have to look for alternative options that could be less burdensome for the 
216 The “Commission v. Denmark” case 261/11 paragraphs 41-48. 
217 Ibid., paragraph 46. 
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taxpayer. The protection of the taxpayer is strong and as a general rule should the taxpayer have the 
option to choose between immediate and deferred recovery of the tax debt, and as long as a state can 
be entitled to ask for security or phased deferral, is it not likely that a restrictive measure would be 




In general, there are no difference between the legality of exit taxes within the EU and the EEA. It is 
however important to see the EU and the EEA as two different legal contexts, and one must ask if it is 
reason to treat a restrictive measure differently within the two legal contexts.  
 
5 Analyse of how states convey with EU- and/or EEA exit tax rules for companies  
 
5.1 Charge of exit taxes on companies within the United Kingdom  
 
5.1.1 Introduction  
 
Exit taxes have been a part of the UK taxation regime for some time, at least since the Taxation of 
Chargeable Gains Act (TCGA) was adopted in 1992, and it applies to both individual and corporate 
taxpayers. The UK amended its exit tax provisions in 2013 with the Finance Act as a respond to the 
ECJ’s judgement in the National Grid Indus case and on request from the Commission.218 The 
objectives of the UK exit tax rules are based log on, among others, to prevent tax avoidance and 
counter act tax avoidance schemes, in addition to the principle of fiscal territoriality. 
 
The basic principle in the UK is that capital gains tax only applies when the latent capital gain of an 
asset or liability is realised219, i.e. subject to sale or in other ways disposed off. Yet there are 
exceptions, and a company that ceases to be tax resident in the UK, or transfers an asset or liability 
outside of the UK tax jurisdiction are deemed to have disposed and reacquired the asset or liability.220 
In other words, the UK considers the removal of taxable income from the UK tax jurisdiction as a 
realisation of the company’s assets, which consequently gives rise to a chargeable gain.  
 
Further on, I will begin with giving an overview over the legal basis for charge of exit tax on 
migrating companies, and then continue with the legal basis for charge of exit tax on assets and 
218 The Commission requested the UK in February 2011 to amend two anti-abuse tax regimes, and in 
March 2012, in the form of a reasoned opinion, to change its exit tax provisions on companies in order 
to make them applicable with EU law. 
219 Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act (CGTA) 1992, § 1 cf. §§ 2, 8 and 15. 
220 TCGA §§ 185 and 186. 
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liabilities that are transferred out of the UK’s tax jurisdiction before I give some remarks to the 
relationship to EU-law.  
 
5.1.2 National provisions  
 
5.1.2.1 Charge of exit taxes on migrating companies 
 
A company, which ceases to be resident in the UK for tax purposes, is charged a tax immediately 
before it becomes a non-resident under national law or a tax treaty.221 It is possible that conflicts arise 
when considering who is a resident in the UK for tax purposes, as the national legislation is based 
upon the incorporation theory222 and most treaties rely on the real seat theory. Such conflicts will in 
most cases be solved by a tiebreaker rule and as a consequence can a company, which is considered a 
UK resident under national law, become a non-resident for tax purposes.223 For example a company, 
which is incorporated in the UK, can under national law transfer its central management and control 
out of the UK and still be a taxpayer to the UK. A company that is incorporated outside the UK on the 
other hand, ceases to be a resident if it transfers its central management and control outside the UK. 
However, a company incorporated in the UK, which transfers its central management and control 
outside of the UK, can become a non-resident of the UK because of a tax treaty.   
 
The exit of a company triggers immediate taxation of a company’s unrealised gains, and the company 
is deemed to have disposed of all its assets at their market value immediately before the exit and to 
have reacquired them at that value at the time of the exit.224 Certain assets are though excluded from 
this charge, as long as the migrating company continues to trade within the UK through a PE. Assets 
that can be excluded are those that are used or held for the purpose of the trade or a PE in the UK.225 
The reason for this is such assets actually remain within the scope of UK tax jurisdiction.226 Moreover 
is it possible to defer payment of tax on foreign assets of a foreign trade where a subsidiary company 
migrates but the principal company remains a resident of the UK.227  
 
Furthermore is it possible to defer the payment of the exit charge if the migrating company enters into 
a payment plan with the HM’s Revenue and Customs. The tax amount however, will be established at 
the time of the migration. For such deferral to be granted is it required that the migrating company a) 
221 TCGA section 185. 
222 Finance Act (FA) 1994 section 249. 
223 The majority of tax treaties contain tiebreaker rules, but there are also those who dont e.g. the tax 
treaty between the USA and the UK. 
224 TCGA section 185. 
225 TCGA section 185 (4). 
226 Corporation Tax Act (CTA) 2009 section 5 (2) and TCGA section 10B. 
227 TCGA section 187.   
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ceases to be resident in the UK and b) becomes a resident in another EEA state and c) is liable to pay 
an exit charge in respect of the migration accounting period.228 In regard of condition b) is it required 
that the company carries on a business in that EEA state229, and c) that the company is not treated as 
resident in a territory outside the EEA for the purposes of any double taxation arrangements.230 In 
order to enter into such a payment plan must the company and the HM’s Revenue Customs agree on 
how the payment shall be done, and hereunder can they choose a payment in accordance with the 
standard instalment method, the realisation method or a combination of the two methods.231 The tax 
deferred will also be subject to interest, and security if it is considered necessary. As for securities is 
there an individual assessment of the risk of non-recovery in each case. In addition, if the taxpayer 
fails to make payments in accordance with the plan can the company be penalised.   
 
The standard instalment method involves that the payment is do be done in six instalments of equal 
amounts over sixth year, starting with the first payment on the first day after the period of 9 months 
beginning immediately after the migration.232 The realisation method233 on the other hand, involves 
that the payment of tax, on other assets than intangibles, is deferred until the asset or liability is wholly 
or partly disposed. Such deferral has an upper limit of 10 years. For fixed intangible assets and 
financial assets however, is the payment required in annual instalments over ten years or over the 
useful economic life of the asset or liability. The useful economic life of an asset or liability will be 
determined at the time of the exit. Moreover are both options are supplemented by a regular reporting 
requirement.   
 
Companies that become non-residents of the UK and that maintain to carry on trade in the UK through 
a PE there, can also opt to defer the payment of exit charges, even if the company migrates to a third 
state.234   
 
Before a company migrates is it required to notify the HM Revenue & Customs Board of the UK 
about its intentions to migrate and provide a statement of its tax liabilities, and make arrangements for 
securing the payment of the tax in due course, and obtain the Board’s approval of the arrangements.235  
 
228 Finance Act (FA) 2013 Schedule 3ZB, Part 1, section 1.  
229 The basic test is whether the company carries on genuine economic business activites in the other 
state, or if it is just ”a wholly artificial arrangement,” see the ”Cadbury Schweppes plc & Cadbury 
Schweppes Overseas Ltd v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue” Case C-196/04 (2006).   
230 FA Schedule 3ZB, Part 1, section 1. 
231 Ibid. Part 3, section 8.  
232 Ibid. Part 3, section 13. 
233 Ibid. Part 3, section 14 and 15. 
234 Ibid. Part 2 section 4. 
235 Finance Act 1988 section 130-132.  
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5.1.2.2 Exit taxes charged on transferred assets and liabilities  
 
 As a starting point, under the UK law will the transfer of an asset or liability from a resident of the 
UK for tax purposes, to a recipient abroad, trigger charge of an “income charge” on the transferor. The 
tax is charged only where there has been a transfer of assets and, as a result of the transfer, income 
becomes payable to a person abroad, but the transferor is still able to enjoy the income of the person 
abroad, or receives, or is entitled to receive a capital sum, or another UK resident receives a benefit 
from the arrangements.236 The provisions apply to individual taxpayers, who are UK residents (natural 
or legal persons). The objective of the provisions is to prevent tax avoidance by individuals, and the 
rules seek to counteract tax-avoidance schemes by individuals who use companies, trusts or other 
entities, which are residents of other countries, to reduce UK tax liability.  
   
Certain conditions must be met in order to make the tax applicable, and basically are there four 
conditions: 1) there must be a transfer of assets by an individual, 2) as a result of the transfer (alone or 
in conjunction with associated operations) income becomes payable to a person abroad, 3) the 
individual has power to enjoy that income in some way as a result of a transfer of assets alone or 
together with associated operations, or receive/be entitled to receive a capital sum in any way 
connected with any relevant transactions, and 4) the recipient of the benefit must be a resident in the 
UK in the year of the charge.237 When these requirements are fulfilled, will the individual (UK 
taxpayer) be taxed on income accruing from the transferred asset or liability, even though the capital 
gain actually is accruing outside of the UK.    
 
Moreover, if an asset or liability is transferred abroad can a “Benefits Charge” be charged on a 
resident of the UK, other than the transferor, if that resident receives benefits from the transferred asset 
or liability.238 Basically are there three conditions that must be met; 1) there must be a relevant 
transfer, 2) an individual who is a UK resident receives a benefit, which is not otherwise chargeable to 
Income Tax, out of assets which are available for the purpose as a result of the transfer or one or more 
associated operations, and 3) the recipient of the benefit must be resident in the UK in the year of the 
charge.239The difference between the benefits charge and the income charge discussed above is that 
the transferor and the beneficiary are different persons, yet both taxes intend to charge the beneficiary. 
The benefits charge typically applies to beneficiaries of non-resident trusts who receive benefits or 
capital payments from trustees.  
 
236 Income Tax Act (ITA) 2007 Chapter 2 Transfer of Assets Abroad, section 721,727 and 231.  
237 Ibid., 732. 
238 ITA section 731. 
239 Ibid., section 732.  
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Special rules apply if the transferor is a resident, but not domiciled in the UK. In such cases will the 
transferor only be taxed in respect of UK source income and foreign income if it is remitted240 to the 
UK. 241 
 
Nevertheless, there are exemptions from the above mentioned tax-avoidance regimes, but here I will 
only discuss the exemption relevant for transfers of assets and liabilities to another EEA state. An 
individual residing in the UK who transfers assets or liabilities to another EEA state is automatically 
exempted from this charge if two conditions are fulfilled, a) the transfer is within the EEA and b) that 
it is a genuine transaction. If a transaction is “genuine” or not depends on whether it has been made in 
accordance with the arm’s length principle, and with regard to any arrangements under which it is 
affected and any other relevant circumstances.242 In EU terms is the test basically whether the 
transaction only is a purely artificial arrangement or not. The exemption is intended to cover genuine 
commercial business activities that take place abroad. However, transactions that do not involve 
business activities but still are regarded as genuine transactions will also be covered by the exemption. 
Consequently will only non-genuine transactions be liable to tax.      
 
5.1.3 Relationship to EU-law 
 
The basic rule under domestic legislation is that a migrating company is charged an exit tax on hidden 
reserves. However, there are exemptions, and under the current legalisation can a company, which 
migrates to another EEA state, opt between immediate and deferred payment of the tax. Yet, the tax 
debt is established at the time of the transfer, but this is in accordance with EU-law. When a company 
choose to defer the payment must the payment be done in accord with the standard instalment method, 
the realisation method or a mix between the two. If the realisation method is chosen, then must the 
payment bed done either when the latent capital gain is realised or when the asset’s useful economic 
life has ended, although there is an upper limit of 10 years. It can be questioned whether this 10-year 
time limit is proportionate. The starting point confer case law from the ECJ, is that the taxpayer shall 
have the possibility to opt for deferral of the payment until the time when the capital gain is realised, 
i.e. the asset or liability is disposed. Yet, in the case “DMC Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH v. 
Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte” 243 accepted the ECJ that a 5-year deferral could be proportionate because 
of an assets nature; some capital gains are realised over time as they are depreciated. The assets at 
issue in the case were interest payments, i.e. intangible assets. The realisation method under the UK 
240 In general, is a remittance for this purpose a transfer of money; the import of goods purchaded 
aborad is not a remittance until the goods are sold, see ”remittance basis” in Oxford Dictionary of 
Law, edithed by Jonathan Law and Elizabeth A. Martin, 7th edition, Oxford University Press. 
241 ITA section 735. 
242 Finance Act 2013 Schedule 10, part 2, section 742A (6). 
243 case C-164/12 “DMC Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH v. Finanzamt Hamburg-Mitte”  
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legislation does however not apply to intangible assets, thus is it possible that the provision is 
disproportionate. The rule is still that it shall be possible to defer the payment of an exit tax until the 
capital gains are realised, as long as the company finds that deferral will not create an excessive 
administrative burden. Under the UK legislation as it is now, can the payment of a tax debt on an 
asset, which may exist in more than 10 years, not be deferred until realisation but only 10 years.    
 
The UK legislation provides further that payment of tax on intangible- and financial assets can be 
deferred and paid in instalments over ten years. This however, must be proportionate, as the ECJ 
accepted a 5-year deferral of such assets in the “DMC Beteiligungsgesellschaft mbH v. Finanzamt 
Hamburg-Mitte” case.244 
 
Under the UK law becomes transferred assets or liabilities subject to an exit charge if the transferor or 
a third person, who are residents of the UK for tax purposes, receives benefits from the transferred 
asset or liability. Nevertheless, there is an exemption from these rules if the asset or liability is 
transferred to another EEA state, then will the transferor or other beneficiaries not be taxed on the 
income. However, if the transaction is not genuine, then will the transferor or other beneficiaries still 
be liable for taxation. The purpose of these provisions is to prevent tax avoidance, and they are 
particularly designed to counteract tax avoidance schemes. It is clear that rules, which charge tax on 
cross-border transactions just because they are made cross-border, are restrictive to treaty freedoms, 
but the objective to prevent tax avoidance can still be legitimate. Additionally, as the restrictive 
provisions are especially designed to prevent tax avoidance and they only apply on non-genuine 
transactions, can they be justified.  Overall, the UK provisions regarding taxation on transfers of assets 








5.2 Charge of exit taxes on companies in Norway  
 




                                                        
Exit taxes are a rather new tax mechanism in Norway, although some provisions were presented as a 
part of a tax reform in 1991.245 In recent years have exit taxes been introduced in three waves: as from 
1 January 2007 for capital gains on shares owned by individuals, as from 1 January 2008 on SEs and 
as from 1 January 2009 on joint-stock companies in general and their shareholders, as well as on 
assets and liabilities.246 The Norwegian exit tax rules are mainly based on the objective to counteract 
tax avoidance schemes, but also the principle of fiscal territoriality.  
 
Under Norwegian tax law is the general rule that capital gains and losses are neither deemed gained 
nor deducted until the asset or liability is realised.247 Still there are exceptions, and unrealised capital 
gains are taxed when the taxpayer, individual or company, ceases to be liable to tax in Norway or the 
asset or liability is transferred out of the Norwegian tax jurisdiction. In other words, the removal of 
taxable income from the Norwegian tax jurisdiction is seen as a realisation of the capital gain of the 
asset or liability.  
 
Further on, I will begin with giving an overview over the legal basis for charge of exit tax on 
migrating companies, and then continue with the legal basis for charge of exit tax on assets and 
liabilities that are transferred out of the Norwegian tax jurisdiction before I give some remarks to the 
relationship to the EEA-Agreement.  
 
5.2.2 National provisions  
 
5.2.2.1 Exit taxes charged on migrating companies 
 
Exit tax on companies are triggered the day before the company ceases to be resident in Norway for 
tax purposes according to Norwegian tax law248 or a tax treaty.249 There is no big difference between 
resident for tax purposes according to Norwegian tax law or a tax treaty, as they both are based on the 
real seat theory. However, it could be a difference in fact as the domestic Norwegian law relies more 
heavily on the place where the board of the company makes its decisions than treaties do.250  
Consequently it can happen that a company established in another state, but which has its effective 
management in Norway, are regarded as a taxpayer in Norway and thus becomes subject to an exit tax 
if it transfers its effective management to another state.    
245 See Professor Frederik Zimmer, article ”Exit Taxes in Norway” Word Tax Journal, October 2009 
p. 115. 
246 Ibid.  
247 Skatteloven (the General Taxes Act, GTA) §§ 5-1, 5-30 and 6-2.   
248 GTA § 2-2. 
249 GTA § 10-71 (1). 
250 Professor Frederik Zimmer, article ”Exit Taxes in Norway” Word Tax Journal, October 2009 p. 
131. 
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The exit of a company triggers immediate taxation of unrealised capital gains on the company’s assets 
and liabilities, but also the right to deduct losses, i.e. the exit is in itself regarded as a realisation of a 
company’s hidden reserves. The capital gain or loss corresponds to the difference between the asset or 
liability’s market value and its tax value at the time of the transfer. 
 
However, the general exit tax duty only apply when the company, which becomes a non-resident, 
establish itself in a state outside of the EEA, or migrates to a low tax country within the EEA and the 
company is not actually established in that host Member State or carries on genuine economic 
activities there.251 Which countries are considered low tax countries follows by law252, and in general 
are all countries with a tax level below two thirds of the tax level that is applicable to similar 
companies in Norway, considered as low tax countries. From 2014 is the Norwegian company tax 
27%, and none of the EEA States are considered as low tax countries.253  
 
Nevertheless, a company can migrate to another EEA state without triggering immediate exit taxation. 
Such tax-free migration is conditioned upon that the company continues to be subject to tax in Norway 
through a PE, and that the company’s assets and liabilities are kept effectively connected to the PE 
following the transfer. In this regard are the exit taxation rules for assets and liabilities important 
because if the assets and liabilities, which are assigned to the Norwegian PE, are transferred out of the 
Norwegian tax jurisdiction, will these rules be applicable to those assets and liabilities.   
 
5.2.2.2 Exit taxes charged on transferred assets and liabilities  
 
Taxation of assets and liabilities, which are transferred out of the Norwegian tax jurisdiction, applies 
equally to assets and liabilities whether held by individuals, companies or other legal persons. In 
principle do the rules apply to all assets, whether tangible, financial or intangible, including real estate 
although in practice will the exit tax provisions not apply to such assets. However, tangible assets are 
only included if a depreciation allowance is granted, and movable tangible assets are only included 
when they, by the time of the exit, are connected to the business of the shareholder that rules on 
business income would apply i.e. private movable assets does not fall within the scope of this 
legislation.254Ordinary debt claims outside the business of the creditor are also excluded, along with 
251 GTA § 10-71 (2) cf. § 10-64 litra b (the requirement of genuine economic activities) 
252 GTA § 10-63 and FSSD § 10-63.  
253 European microstates as for example Andorra, Monaco and Montenegro are listed as low tax 
countries, but neither of them are part of the EEA. 
254 Professor Frederik Zimmer, article ”Exit Taxes in Norway” Word Tax Journal, October 2009 p. 
139. 
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financial assets owned by individuals.255 Financial assets held by individuals are however regulated by 
another rule. The statute rule distinguish the relevant assets into five categories: I) fixed tangible 
business assets, II) financial assets, III) liabilities, IV) inventories and V) intangible assets.256  
 
The exit tax is imposed when the asset or liability is transferred out of the Norwegian tax jurisdiction, 
as if the asset or liability was sold on the day before such transfer took place. The triggering factor is 
not based on a geographical concept, but rather the legal concept of the Norwegian tax jurisdiction. 
Such transfer is deemed to have taken place when Norway no longer has sufficient legal basis, 
according to domestic law or tax treaties, to tax the asset or liability. The taxable capital gain 
corresponds to the difference between the asset/liability’s market value257 and the tax base at the time 
of the transfer. Correspondingly can calculated loss be tax deductible.  
 
The statute divide the tax-triggering event into three broad groups of cases: I) when a taxpayer 
becomes a non-resident of the Norwegian tax jurisdiction, hereunder is it distinguished between a) 
transfer of the assets/liabilities themselves and b) the taxpayer ceases to be a tax resident of Norway, 
II) when a non-resident taxpayer with PE in Norway transfers assets or liabilities abroad and III) if the 
Norwegian control of a CFC-company258 comes to and end, and the assets/liabilities thus no longer are 
under the Norwegian tax jurisdiction.  
 
If the taxpayer is a Norwegian resident or a resident of another EEA state can the payment of tax 
charged on fixed tangible business assets, financial assets or liabilities be deferred. Conversely if there 
is a genuine risk of non-recovery, can it be required security for the deferred tax and incurred interest. 
Exit taxes imposed on intangible assets and inventories cannot be deferred and must paid immediately 
upon the transfer. The legislator’s reason for the exemption of intangible assets and inventories in 
regard of the possibility for deferral is split; intangible assets are often kept by the taxpayer and may 
never be sold and the value of such assets will therefore often vanish, whilst inventories on the 
contrary normally are sold within a short period of time and that the latent capital gains are usually 
low.  
 
When the payment is deferred the exit tax liability will terminate when the asset or liability in question 
is sold or in other ways realised. If an asset or liability is brought back to the Norwegian tax 
jurisdiction will this not have that consequence that the tax is waived. If the asset or liability is sold at 
255 Ibid. 
256 GTA § 9-14. 
257 If the transfer is between related parties e.g. intragroup parties or other parties with shared interests, 
shall the actual market price be used cf. the arm’s length principle, see Article 9 OECD MC.  
258 Short for controlled foreign corporation, i.e. companies that are residing in low-tax countries, but 
are controlled by, in this case, Norwegian residents. 
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a later time, will the input vale of the asset or liability be set to the market value at the time of the re-
entry. This is different from the general rule that the original cost price shall be set as the input value, 
and is reasoned by the objective to prevent international double taxation.  
 
5.2.3 Relationship to the EEA-Agreement  
 
After the “National Grid Indus” case was it made several amendments to the Norwegian exit tax 
provisions in order to ensure accordance with the EEA-Agreement, and the general exit tax duty on 
companies now mainly only apply if a company migrates to a state outside of the EEA. Assets and 
liabilities that are transferred abroad do also become subject to taxation, but if they are transferred to 
another state within the EEA, can the payment of the tax on most assets and liabilities be deferred. 
However, the payment of tax on intangible assets and inventories cannot be deferred, i.e. intangible 
assets and inventories are subject to immediate taxation at the time of the transfer. Thus can it still be 
questioned whether the Norwegian exit tax regime is fully compatible with the EEA-Agreement.  
 
It is clear from EU/EEA-law that it is inconsistent to require immediate recovery of an exit tax, and 
the taxpayer must be able to opt between immediate and deferred payment of the tax.259 Immediate 
taxation of intangible assets and inventories with no possibility of deferral is therefore most likely an 
infringement of the EEA-Agreement. Per today however, there is no indication for that the Norwegian 
legislation will be amended.  
 
5.3 Comparison of the different exit taxation regimes applicable on companies in the UK and Norway  
Both the UK and Norway apply exit charges on companies that become non-residents for tax 
purposes, and on assets and liabilities that are transferred out of their respective tax jurisdictions. How 
their exit tax provisions are designed are on the other hand quite different. In the UK is there a more 
evident separation of exit taxes charged on migrating companies, and exit taxes charged on transferred 
assets and liabilities, and two individual set of rules are applied. A company that migrates from the 
UK and becomes a tax resident of another state within the EEA can choose between immediate 
payment of the tax debt, or opt for deferral. Assets or liabilities that are transferred to another EEA 
state can on the other hand be transferred tax-free as long as the transaction is genuine.  
 
In Norway is it exactly they same rules that applicably in regard of transfer of assets or liabilities 
abroad, whether it only is a transfer of an asset or liability, or if the transfer happens as part of a 
company’s migration. The provisions particularly addressing migrating companies only regulate 
259 See the cases “National Grid Indus” C-371/10 paragraph 86, “Commission v. the Netherlands” 
301/11 paragraph 16, “Commission v. Portugal” C-38/10 paragraph 32.  
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when the exit tax on a company’s unrealised capital gains is triggered (the migration) and 
provides exemptions from the general tax duty, e.g. that a Norwegian company can migrate to 
another EEA state without triggering the tax, as long as the transfer is genuine. In regard of 
assets and liabilities that will be subject to transfer, is it the general rules for transfer of assets 
and liabilities abroad that are applicable. It is those rules that specify how the exit charge applies 
to each asset or liability, and regulates deferral. Norway does not, as the UK, treat the migration 
of a company and transfer of assets and liabilities as two separate situations, but see them as 
two connected events. 
 
As for the material substance are the two exit tax regimes more alike, at least in regard of the basics; 
exit taxes are applied to both migrating companies and transferred assets, deferral can be granted, 
security can be asked for in order to grant deferral and interest can be charged. Both systems have also 
taken regard to their obligations as member states of the EEA. However, the mechanisms for granting 
deferral differ from each other; the UK provides a seemingly complex system for grant of deferral, and 
a company can choose between the standard instalment method, where the tax is paid over a six-year 
period, or the realisation method, where the payment is deferred until the latent capital gain is realised 
or 10 year after the transfer, or a mix between the two. The realisation method however, does not 
apply to intangible assets, i.e. such assets must be paid in accordance with the standard instalment 
method. Under Norwegian law can companies, which migrate and become tax residents of another 
EEA country, simply defer the payment of the tax until the unrealised capital gains are realised. There 
is no upper time limit that deems realisation of the latent capital gain. The payment of tax on 
intangibles and inventories can though not be deferred; this is nonetheless similar to the UK 
provisions.  
 
It is interesting that both UK and Norway have chosen limited deferral or not provide deferral in 
relation to intangible assets. Norway has reasoned its rule to not grant deferral to such assets because 
their nature; they will most likely not be disposed and their value will often vanish over time. It was 
therefore regarded that immediate taxation was necessary in order to ensure efficient recovery of the 
tax and prevent tax avoidance. To prevent tax avoidance was also an important objective behind the 
UK provisions. Nevertheless, the ECJ has mentioned the fact that some assets distinguish from others, 
because of their nature, but the taxpayer should still be able to opt for deferral. In the Commission v. 
Denmark260 case stated the ECJ nevertheless that the Member States are entitled to provide an 
alternative criterion for recovery of the tax, other than at the time the asset is sold. This was however 
limited to assets that were not expected to be realised. The Norwegian rule, which requires immediate 
payment of an exit tax charged on intangible assets, is most likely infringing Norway’s obligations 
260 The “Commission v. Denmark” case 261/11 
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under the EEA-Agreement, as there is no possibility of deferral. The UK provisions on the other hand, 
is probably in accordance with EU-law, as it provides the possibility to pay the tax debt of intangible 
assets in annual instalments over 10 years or in annual instalments over the useful life of the asset.      
 
Differently from Norway, does the UK have a separate legal framework for the situation where an 
individual taxpayer of the UK (individual or legal person) transfers assets or liabilities abroad to 
another person. The transferor, or other beneficiary, becomes liable to tax in the UK if he receives 
income from the transferred asset or liability. However, assets or liabilities that are transferred to 
another EEA state are exempted from such tax as long as the transaction is genuine. This taxation 
regime is interesting as it is created only in order to counteract tax-avoidance schemes.  
 
Overall do the UK and Norway have similar exit tax regimes, but there are individual differences 
when one looks more closely on have the provisions apply in the specific situation.  
 
6 Concluding Remarks   
 
The ECJ have ruled in several cases regarding exit taxes charged on companies the last years, and the 
legal framework around charge of exit taxes have become clearer; the main conditions under which 
the states can apply exit charges in situations where they lose their right to tax unrealised capital gains 
because of a cross-border migration or transfer within the EEA, has been set out. However, there are 
still issues that need to be figured. In one of the newest cases261 by the ECJ has it been implied that the 
nature of specific assets can make it proportionate have another criteria than the actual realisation of 
the asset, to decide when the exit tax is to be finally recovered. Moreover, it is still undefined under 
what circumstances requirements as charge of interest and the obligation to provide security is 
proportionate.   
 
The conflict between legitimate national interests of protecting the state´s tax base and prevent tax 
avoidance, contra the functioning of the internal market principles is obvious, and the discussion 
above shows that national exit taxation regimes raise numerous issues both in a domestic- and 
EU/EEA-context. Nevertheless, the EEA consist of 31 different tax systems, and it is necessary that 
the states cooperate and harmonise their taxation regimes in order to ensure the functioning of the 
internal market. How such cooperation and harmonisation should be done, in order to protect both the 
state’s sovereignty and ensure efficiency is not clear. The EU institutions have tried to set out “guiding 
principles” at EU-level, but the states have not been eager amend their national legislation in order to 
harmonise their taxation regimes. Additionally is it also an issue that the three EFTA-states, which 
261 Ibid.  
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participate in the EEA, are not subject to all of the same acts as the EU Member States. Nevertheless, 
exit taxes form an integral part of many states taxation regimes, and I do not think that they will be 
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